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By Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution of the United
States, it is provided that:
"The judicial power (of the United States) shall extend

.

.

. to controversies between two or more States;

between a State and citizens of another State, between citizens of different States, . . . and between a State, or the

citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects."
The potential jurisdiction thus vested in the federal judiciary
to adjudicate controversies concerning foreign citizens or between
citizens of different States has been described as an integral-part
of the federal design. Thus, states Hamilton in The Federalist:
"The fourth point rests on this plain proposition, that
the peace of the WHOLE, ought not to be left at the disposal
of a PART. The union will undoubtedly be answerable to
foreign powers for the conduct of its members. And the
responsibility for an injury, ought ever to be accompanied
with the faculty of preventing it. As the denial or perversion of justice by the sentences of courts, is with reason
classed among the just causes of war, it will follow, that the
federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in
which the citizens of other countries are concerned. This is
not less essential to the preservation of the public faith, than
to the security of the public tranquillity. .

..

"The power of determining causes between one state
and the citizens of another, and between the citizens of different states, is perhaps not less essential to the peace of the
union, than that which has been just examined. .

.

. What-

ever practices may have a tendency to disturb the harmony
(869)
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of the states, are proper objects of federal superintendence
and control.
"It may be esteemed the basis of the union, that 'the
citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the several states.' And if it be a
just principle, that every government ought to possess the
means of executing its own provisions, by its own authority,

it will follow, that in order to the inviolable maintenance of
that equality of privileges and immunities, to which the citizens of the union will be entitled, the national judiciary ought
to preside in all cases, in which one state or its citizens are
opposed to another state or its citizens. To secure the full
effect of so fundamental a provision against all evasion and
subterfuge, it is necessary that its construction should be
committed to that tribunal, which, having no local attachments, will be likely to be impartial, between the different
states and their citizens, and which, owing its official existence to the union, will never be likely to feel any bias inauspicious to the principles on which it is founded." '
'THE FEDERALIST (John C.

(1788).

Hamilton's ed.

1875)

588-go, No. LXXX

Hamilton's conception, namely, that the federal diverse-citizenship jurisdiction is necessary to enforce the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Constitution, is accepted by Henderson in his monograph, THE POSlTIOM OF
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS I, AmERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1918) 182, "And
if we look at the scheme of the Constitution as a whole, there is little- ground
to doubt that the word 'citizen' was used in precisely the same sense in the
jurisdictional provisions, as in the privileges and immunities clause. Both were
designed to secure citizens against discrimination and hostile treatment on the
ground of citizenship--the former against legislative inequalities, the latter
against the more intangible and elusive influence of hostility in judicial procedure. Indeed, Hamilton looked upon the jurisdictional provisions primarily
as the procedural machinery for effectively securing the substantial rights conferred b3 the privileges and immunities clause."
This view is, however, questioned by Warren, on the ground that an adequate remedy is provided for discriminatory decisions in the state courts by
writ of error under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See Warren, New
Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 (1923) 37 HARV.
L. REV. 49, 82. Friendly regards Hamilton's interpretation as merely a specimen of syllogistic logic, and states that, "if a state denies to a citizen of another state a privilege which it grants to one of its own, we have a ground of
federal jurisdiction quite independent of the citizenship of the parties." See
Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction (1928) 41 HARv. L.
REv. 483, 485, 492 n. Both criticisms seem to assume that the constitutional
review of state judicial decision, like the recognized review of state legislation,
is within the federal judicial power. This is very doubtful; the parallel decisions of the Supreme Court under the Fourteenth Amendment, which has
largely displaced the Privileges and Immunities Clause, indicate that the Supreme Court will not undertake the appellate review of state judicial decisions,
even if discriminatory; see Patterson v. Colorado, ex rel. Attorney-General,
205 U. S. 454, 27 Sup. Ct. 556 (1907) ; Milwaukee Electric Railway and Light
Co. v. State of Wisconsin ex rel. City of Milwaukee, 252 U. S. 100, io6, 40
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Thus conceived, the jurisdiction of the federal courts in cases
involving diversity of citizenship is an application of the principle
that within its sphere the federal government should be a government, not of corporate states, but of individuals. 2 Accordingly,
in cases involving foreigners or between citizens of different states,
original cognizance was given to the federal courts by the First
Judiciary Act and, with variations of detail, not of principle, in the
3
limitations originally established, has been exercised ever since.
Sup. Ct. 3o6, 308 (192o) ; American Railway Express Co. v. Commonwealth of

Kentucky, 273 U. S.269, 273; 47 Sup. Ct. 353, 355 (I927). For a discussion
of the relation between the Fourteenth Amendment and the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, see HENDERSON, op. Cit. supra, at 177 et seq.
Moreover, the remedy by writ of error in cases of violations of the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not cover perhaps the most important types
of cases; it is not available to foreign corporations not engaged in interstate
commerce, they not being regarded as "citizens" under the Privileges and Immumities Clause, even in cases involving discriminatory state legislation and, a
fortiori, discriminatory judicial decision. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 178
(U. S.1869) ; Ducat v. Chicago, io Wall. 410, 415 (U. S.187I) ; Liverpool and
London Life and Fire Insurance Co. v. Oliver, io Wall. 566, 573 (U. S. 187);
Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 2z39, 259, I9 Sup. Ct I65, i73 (1898).
2
E. g., THE FEDERALIST, supra note I, Nos. XX, XXI (1787). Corwin
states: "The essential defect of the Articles of Confederation, as has been so
often pointed out, consisted in the fact that the government established by
them operated not upon the individual citizens of the United States but upon
the states in their corporate capacity-that, in brief, it was not a government
at all, but rather the central agency of an alliance. As a consequence, on the
one hand, even the powers theoretically belonging to the Congress of the Confederation were practically unenforceable; while, on the other hand, the theoretical scope of its authority was unduly narrow. Inasmuch as taxes are collectible from individuals, Congress could not levy them; inasmuch as commerce is an affair of individuals, Congress could not regulate it; and its treaties
had not at first the force of laws, since to have given them that operation would
again have been to impinge upon individuals directly and nof through the mediation of the state legislatures. Furthermore, the powers withheld from Congress remained with the states-which is to say, with their legislatures. The
evil thence resulting was thus a double one. Not only was a common policy
impracticable in fields where it was most evidently necessary, but also the local
legislatures had it in their power to embroil both the country as a whole with
foreign nations and its constituent parts with each other. So the weakness of
the Confederation played directly into the hands of the chief defect of government within the states themselves-an excessive concentration of power in the
hands of the legislature department" The Progress of Constitutional Theory
Between the Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia
Convention (1925) 30 AMl. HisT. REV. 511, 527-528. See also Madison's explanation in his letter to Jefferson of October 24, 1787. 5 HUNT, WaRINGS OF
(1904) 17, 19 et seq.
The Articles of Confederation, it may be noted, assured to the free inhab-

JAMES MADIs N

itants of each state, "all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States", but was defective in that no machinery was provided for their enforcement. Article IV, i POORE, THE F5DERAL AND STATE CONsTITUTIONS
(1877) 8.
The provisions of the First Judiciary Act establishing the diverse-citizenship jurisdiction are as follows:
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It is well known that this solution was reached not without
controversy in the debates of the time,-in the Constitutional
Convention, 4 in the state legislatures and conventions, 5 and in
the First Congress. 6 The controversy, which has its roots in
divergent views as to the proper function of the federal courts,
would seem to be perennial. Recently there have been before
"Sec. ii. And be it further enacted, That the circuit courts shall have
original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all
suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute
exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and the
United States are plaintiffs, or petitioners; or an alien is a party, or the suit is
between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State. And shall have exclusive cognizance of all crimes and offences
cognizable under the authority of the United States, except where this act
otherwise provides, or the laws of the United States shall otherwise direct, and
concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts of the crimes and offences cognizable therein. But no person shall be arrested in one district for trial in
another, in any civil action before a circuit or district court. And no civil suit
shall be brought before either of said courts against an inhabitant of the United
States, by any original process in any other district than that whereof he is an
inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at the time of serving the writ, nor
shall any district or circuit court have cognizance of any suit to recover the
contents of any promissory note or other chose in action in favour of an assignee, unless a suit might hate been prosecuted in such court to recover the
said contents if no assignment had been made, except in cases of foreign bills
of exchange. And the circuit courts shall also have appellate jurisdiction from
the district courts under the regulations and restrictions herein after provided."
Sec. I2 provides, "That if a suit be commenced in any state court against
an alien, or by a citizen of the state in which the suit is brought against
a citizen of another state, and the matter in dispute exceeds the aforesaid sum
or value of five hundred dollars, exclusive of costs, to be made to appear to the
satisfaction of the court", the defendant could file a petition for the removal
of the case from the state court to the nearest circuit court.
"Sec. 34. And be it further enacted, That the laws of the several states,
except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at
common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply."
I STAT. 78, 79, 92 (1789). Cf. 28 U. S. C. A. §§ 41 (I, 2) 71 n., 725 (1927).
'See FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (1911)
passimn; Friendly, op. cit. supra note I, at 484 et seq.
See ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1836) passimn; Friendly,
op. cit. supra note I, at 487 et seq. A vigorous pamphlet war was waged between federalists and anti-federalists during the period preceding the various
state conventions. For references in this literature to the federal diversity
jurisdiction, see THE FEDERALIST, supra note I; Pelatiat Webster's Defence of
the New Constitution (1787), reprinted in The Real Authorship of the Constitution of the United States Explained, SEN. Doc. No. 787, v. 29, 62d Cong. 2d
Sess., 79, 83, 84 (1912); FORD, PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES
STONE,

(1883)

PENNSYLVANIA

53, 102, 149, 238, 307, 308, 329, 330; McMASTR ANID
AND

THE FEDERAL

CONSTITUTION

1787-1788,

(1888)

571, 582 et seq.

Warren, op. cit. supra note I, at 66-69, 77-78, 125-127.
supra note I, at 5o0 et seq.

Friendly, op. cit.
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Congress proposals which have looked to the substantial diminution
or even the abolition of the jurisdiction of the federal courts in
controversies between citizens of different States.7 These proposals have been supported by arguments, historical, political and
doctrinaire.
Thus far, the historical study of the "diversity" jurisdiction
of the federal courts has been too limited in time and scope to
'In recent ycars bills of three main types have been introduced in Congress: (I) To abolish jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship. S. 315I
(Senator Norris) 70th Cong. Ist Sess. See SEN. REP. 626 of Committee on
the Judiciary, March 27, 1928. S. 4,357 (Senator Norris) 71st Cong. 2d Sess.
See SEN. REP. 691 of Committee on the Judiciary, May 20, 193o. (2) To raise
the jurisdictional amount from $3oo to $ioooo. H. R. 6679 (Mr. Parks) 7oth
Cong. Ist Sess. (3) To abolish the rule of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. i (U. S.
1842) by providing that the decisions of the highest court of a state shall govern
the courts of the United States in the ascertainment of the common law or general jurisprudence (Senator Walsh) S. 4333, 70th Cong. ist Sess.; S. 96, 71st
Cong. ist Sess.

It may be noted that the recent bills in Congress to limit the scope of injunctions in labor disputes would affect the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction
as well as the federal jurisdiction to grant labor injunctions under the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act. S. 1482 (Senator Shipstead) 7oth Cong. Ist Sess. 69 CO G.
RIc. 475, 10050 (1928). See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee
on the Judiciary, U. S. Senate, 7oth Cong. Ist Sess., on S. 1482, A Bill to
Amend the Judicial Code and to Define and Limit the Jurisdiction of Courts
Sitting in Equity, Parts I-5 (1928), S. 2497 (Senator Shipstead) 71St Cong.
2d Sess. The latter bill was reported adversely: SEN. REP. lo6o; 72 CONG.
REc.

276, 10250, 11271, 11764 (1930).

The diverse-citizenship jurisdiction in

labor disputes has assumed great importance for the two reasons: (i) the leading "yellow-dog" contract decision was based upon that ground, Hitchman Coal
and Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65 (1917) ; (2) if inter-

state commerce is not affected and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act inapplicable,
diversity of citizenship is one of the most important alternative bases of federal jurisdiction. For an interesting recent case, illustrating the point see
Washington Cleaning & Dyeing Co. v. Cleaners', Dyers' and Pressers' Union,
Local No. 17920, et al., 34 F. (2d) 897 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
However, not all recent legislative proposals as to the federal jurisdiction
in civil cases would involve reduction in the scope of the diversity jurisdiction.
The bill providing for declaratory judgments in the federal courts in cases
otherwise within their jurisdiction would automatically apply to diversity of
citizenship cases. See H. R. 5623 (Mr. Montague) 70th Cong. Ist Sess.;
Hearings before a Svbcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
April 27 and May 18, 1928; H. R. 23 (Mr. Montague) 71St Cong. ist Sess.;
S. 25oi (Senator King) 71st Cong. 2d Sess.

Certain other proposals designed to affect the power and selection of federal judges might, if passed, have an indirect effect upon diverse-citizenship
cases by reducing the advantages of litigation in the federal court under certain
circumstances. S. io94 (Senator Caraway) 7oth Con. Ist Sess., depriving federal judges of the power to comment on the evidence in jury cases. 69 CONG.
REc. 1578, 4965, 4968, 5202 (1928) ; S. 374 (Senator Caraway) 71 CONG. REc.
255 (1929).
A constitutional amendment for the election of federal judges

has been recently proposed; S. J. Res.
CONG.

REc. 1934 (1930).

126

(Mr. Dill) 71st Cong. 2d Sess.,

72
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reach a critical point. Two excellent studies have appeared, the
one primarily of the discussion as to this branch of the federal
jurisdiction in the Constitutional Convention," and the other carefully analyzing the pre-natal history of the First Judiciary Act
in committee and in Congress.9 These studies amply demonstrate
the existence of a definite split of opinion between the federalists
and the anti-federalists as to the proper distribution of judicial
power between the states and the federal union. However, institutions undergo transmutations of function as well as form; the
evidence of institutional genesis by no means concludes the exodus.
And in this instance, the employment of such evidence to question
the present basis and policy of the federal diversity jurisdiction, as
seems to be suggested in both studies, 10 would be particularly unsatisfactory. In the first place, the period specificallycovered (17871789) is brief; the crucial experience of the Confederation and
the experience subsequent to 1789 admittedly remain generally to
be studied." In the second place, the character of the evidence
studied precludes extensive inference; it is, in sum, that of opinion
'Friendly, op. cit. supra note i.
" Warren, op. cit. supra note i.
The suggestion is not made explicitly but by inference. Friendly, op. cit.
supra note I, at 510. Warren, op. cit. supra note I, at 131. See also Frankfurter's summary: "Thanks to recent scholarship, we now know a good deal
about the historic basis of this grant of jurisdiction and of its first exercise
in 1789. Plainly enough, this phase of the 'judicial power of the United
States' did not grow out of any serious defects of the Confederacy nor did it
anticipate glaring evils. Even so strong a nationalist as Marshall gave it only
tepid support. The available records disclose no particular grievance against
state tribunals for discrimination against litigants from without. The real fear
was of state legislatures, not of state courts. Such distrust as there was of
local courts derived, not from any fear of their partiality to resident litigants,
but of their general inadequacy for the interests of the business community."
Distrution.of Judicial Power between United States and State Courts (1928)
13 CORN. L. Q. 499, 520.

'Certain aspects have, of course, been treated. Thus, in particular, the
development since 1789 of the doctrines as to "foreign corporations" has been
portrayed by Henderson in an outstanding monograph, op. cit. supra note I;
see especially c. IV, at 5o, in which the evolution of the rules as to the citizenship of foreign corporations for the purposes of the federal diverse-citizenship jurisdiction is discussed, and c. VIII, at 132, which is concerned with
the doctrine of unconstitutional limitations provoked by the state anti-removal
statutes. However, Henderson's treatment of this highly important aspect
of the historical development stands more or less alone and is at best a brilliant but general outline of the evolution of the constitutional doctrine, which
needs to be supplemented at various points. And, in any event, no systematic
effort appears to have been made by Henderson or others, to relate the doctrinal development in question to economic and social factors.
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evidence, (a) taken from a highly surcharged political atmosphere, and neither (b) directed to specific issues of fact nor (c)
substantially in agreement. As Madison wrote at the time:
"The diversity of opinion on so interesting a subject
(the federal Constitution) among men of equal integrity and
discernment is at once a melancholy proof of the fallibility
of the human judgment and of the imperfect progress yet
made in the Science of government." 12
Letter to Archibald Stuart, October 30, 1787, 5
note 2, at 47.

HUNT, op. cit.

snpra

The evidence,* subject to the qualification referred to in note 13 infra, consists of statements made in the course of the extended controversy between
the federalists and the anti-federalists as to the adoption of the Constitution
and its interpretation. As may be observed from the summary in Friendly,
op. cit. sapra note I, at 487, the opinions are not only conflicting but betray
varying apprehensions, in a degree unfounded, as to the scope of the diversecitizenship jurisdiction provided for and its probable effects upon the state
judicial establishments. The suggestion made by both Warren, op. cit. supra
note i,at 8I, and Friendly, loc. cit. supra, that staunch federalists, such as
Madison and Marshall, gave "tepid" support to the federal diverse-citizenship
jurisdiction, probably should be taken cun grano salis; it is to be noted that
the remarks of Madison, Marshall, Randolph and Pendleton, which are chiefly
relied upon for this interpretation, were made in the course of the debates
in the Virginia Convention, in which the opposition headed by Mason and
Henry was very strong. The attitude of the federalists during the controversy
succeeding the Constitutional Convention was necessarily conciliatory, as they
desired primarily to assure the ratification of the Constitution.
More specifically, Madison's remark as to cognizance of disputes between
citizens of different states that, "perhaps it might be left to the state courts",
ELuoT, op. cit. vipra, note 5, III, at 533, should be compared with his argument later in the same speech supporting the federal diversity jurisdiction,
ibid., 535, and with his explicit statement in the Constitutional Convention,
advocating inferior federal tribunals to obviate local prejudice in the state courts,
FARRAN D, op. cit. szpra note 4, I, at i24. See also Madison's summary of
the "Vices of the Political System of the U. States," referring to "occlusion of Courts" as an aggression on the rights of other States, 2 HUNT, op. cit.
surpra note 2 (igoi), at 361, 362. Marshall's statement: "Were I to contend
that this (federal diversity jurisdiction) was necessary in all cases, and that
the government without it would be defective, I should not use my own judgment", Etuor, op. cit. supra note 5, III, 551, at 556, is not to be taken out
of context. It was, as the remainder of Marshall's examination of the matter
shows, a response to Mason's arguments, ibid. 521, 526, and to Henry's assertion that he saw "arising out of that paper a tribunal that is to be recurred to
in all cases, when the destruction of the state judiciaries shall happen," ibid.
542. Thus, no more is indicated than Marshall's view that the federal jurisdiction was not to be exclusive. Similarly, Randolph's suggestion that he
did "not see any absolute necessity for vesting it (the federal court) with
jurisdiction in these cases," ibid. 572, needs to be glossed by the fact that the
suggestion of this particular branch of the federal jurisdiction appears to have
been first made in the Constitutional Convention by Randolph himself in the
proposal of the so-called Virginia Plan, FAmRAND, op. cit. .mpra note 4, I at
22. Pendleton's opinion that, "in general, those decisions might be left to the
state tribunals," seemb to be based on the assumption that "citizens of one state
are declared, to be citizens of all", and is coupled with the assertion of the
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Even for the period covered, it is not demonstrated that the diversity clause was an anomaly or local prejudice inconsequential. 13
The inferences across a hundred and forty years are tenuous.
need of "jurisdiction in the federal judiciary, to stop (the) pernicious effects"
of discriminatory state regulations, EwmoT, op. cit. supra note 5, III, at p.
549. His view, which had been more fully explained earlier in the discussion, ibid. 517 et seq., is, like Marshall's, that the federal jurisdiction in diversecitizenship cases should not be exclusive but that "the necessity and propriety
of a federal jurisdiction, in all such cases, must strike every gentleman", ibid.
518.
The clue to the conciliatory attitude of Madison and the other proponents of the Constitution during the Virginia Convention is furnished, not by
the hypothesis of their indifference to a concurrent federal jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases, but by a passage which occurred between Mason
and Madison early in the proceedings. Mason, whose opposition was most
feared, on June 4, 1786, after stating that "when we come to the judiciary, we
shall be more convinced that this (federal) government will terminate in the
annihilation of the state governments," offered to put his hand to the Constitution, "if such amendments be introduced as shall exclude danger," ibid. 33.
And, as Beveridge states, "Swift as any hawk, the Constitutionalists pounced
upon Mason's error, but they seized it gently as a dove. 'It would give me
great pleasure', cooed Madison, 'to concur with my honorable colleague in any
conciliatory plan", i LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (I916) at 383. The nub of
the matter is that the constitutionalists had to conciliate Mason as to the powers
of the federal judiciary, on which his position was most dangerous and intransigeant.
The foregoing, it is hoped will serve not only to correct a possible misconstruction but also to illustrate the insecurity of the evidence on which the
historical argument referred to in the text rests and the nice problems involved
in its interpretation. This is not to reject opinion evidence as such but to require that it be subjected to the usual canons of historical construction and not
to press it schematically to undue and uncorroborated conclusions. One requisite at least is to set the evidence in the texture of the time and place, which,
for the Virginia Convention, Beveridge has so completely portrayed, ibid.
357 et seq.
'Friendly
seems alone to have made an effort to verify his conclusions
from the opinion evidence by reference to more specific information. He states:
"Only if we could find that the state judges had been notoriously unfair to foreigners, would we be in a position to place much faith in the genuineness of the
classical theory. It is, of course, impossible to obtain accurate information on
this subject. The early state reports give us only a fraction of the cases heard
before the appellate tribunals, themselves an infinitesimal fragment of the
total amount of litigation. But such information as we are able to gather
from the reporters entirely fails to show the existence of prejudice on the
part of the state judges." Op. cit. suprar note I, at 493.
This is a line of inquiry which needs to be more adequately followed. As
Friendly well suggests, the early state reports represent only a fraction of an
"infinitesimal fragment of the total amount of litigation," and this from the
appellate cases, which are scarcely calculated to reflect the vagaries of juries
or even judges at nisi prius. It is the more necessary to -have a comprehensive
search made- if the existence of local prejudice at the time is to be disproved,
as Friendly intimates. A very few authenticated instances would demonstrate
the contrary.
It has not been possible to investigate the formal evidence in detail but it
may perhaps be suggested that the theory of no local prejudice is presumptively improbable. No contemporary denial of the existence of local prejudice
has been found. Indeed, for specific types of cases, there is contemporary evi-
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Nor has the argument in Congress, directed to the limitation
of the federal jurisdiction in cases involving citizens of different
dence of local prejudice. Thus, speaking of the treatment of aliens in the
Virginia County courts, Madison remarked, "We well know, sir, that foreigners cannot get justice done them in these courts, and this has prevented
many wealthy gentlemen from trading or residing among us." ELLIoT, op.
cit. suprca note 5, III at 583. And the situation in the land grant cases was
so notorious as to warrant a specific provision of federal jurisdiction, even in
cases not involving diversity of citizenship. To give a single illustration, Randolph, who can scarcely be regarded as having had a pro-Constitutional bias,
stated: "Under the old government, as well as this, reprisals have been made
by Pennsylvania and Virginia on one another. Reprisals have been made by
the very judiciary of Pennsylvania on the citizens of Virginia. Their differences concerning their boundaries are not yet perhaps ultimately determined.
The legislature of Virginia, in one instance, thought this power right. In the
case of Mr. Nathan, they thought the determination of the dispute ought to
be out of the state, for fear of partiality," ibid. 571. As is well known, the
difficulties as to land grants continued for some time and led to agitation
against the federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, as may be
illustrated by the controversy as to the Virginia and Kentucky land laws, de-

scribed by

WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (I922)

I, at 219 et seq.; II, at 96 et seq.
More generally, the contemporary records are full enough of evidence of

local feelings.

See c. XII, in

AF ER THE REVOLUTION (1924)

NEVINS, THE AMERICAN STATES DURING AND

at 544 et seq. It was difficult to anticipate that

such feelings, in the parlous state of justice at the time, (see Friendly, op. cit.
supra note I, at 497 and Randolph's stringent summary of the situation, ELLioT, oft. cit. supra note 5, III, at 66), should not have found expression on
occasion in verdict of jury or judicial decision, as it did in state regulation,
e. g., for the relief of debtors. Nor, on the point of its prejudicial effect upon
citizens of sister states, are the regulations as to process, which, as in the case
of the Rhode Island tender law, tended to provoke reprisals by other states,
validly distinguishable from the decisions by which they were given practical effect. Madison's analysis of the "Vices of the Political System of the
U. States" is instructive on the point: "Paper money, instalments of debts,
occlusion of Courts, making property a legal tender, may likewise be deemed
aggressions on the rights of other States. As the Citizens of every State
aggregately taken stand more or less in the relation of Creditors or debtors,
to the Citizens of every other State, Acts of the debtor State in favor of
debtors, affect the Creditor State, in the same manner as they do its own citizens who are relatively creditors towards other citizens. This remark may be
extended to foreign nations." 2 HUNT, op. cit. supra note 2 (1901), at 362.
The historic basis of the federal diverse-citizenship jurisdiction cannot well
be tested by a narrow reference of "local prejudice" to judicial decisions apart
from legislation. It is true, for instance, that glaring difficulties such as those
arising from land grants and paper-tender acts, were specifically provided for
in the Constitution; the diversity jurisdiction was one of several granted to
the federal courts to guarantee "equal privileges and immunities" and to assure
the enforcement of the not unrelated constitutional restrictions upon the states
in those cases which had been most productive of disharmony, typically involving the interests of aliens or of the citizens of more than one state. That this
provision was not without justification is suggested by the fate of the judges
who in 1786 ventured to declare the Rhode Island paper-tender act unconsti-

tutional in Trevett v. Weeden, (see HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1914) at 92). The doctrine of judicial review was in
its infancy; even today, as indicated in note I, it does not reach discriminatory
judcial decisions or assure to foreign corporations generally "equal privileges
and immunities" with the citizens of the several states. As Hamilton re-
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states, passed the stage of preliminary opinion. The central proposal, 14 to abolish the federal jurisdiction in suits between citizens
of different states, has been reported favorably by the Senate
Judiciary Committee, but without the benefit of a hearing. 15
Obviously, the considerations advanced in the committee report,
namely, (a) that the expense attendant upon federal litigation
will be saved to the parties and inequality of litigating power as
between the resident individual and the foreign corporation eliminated, (b) that the jurisdiction unreasonably "makes property
rights more valuable than human rights", and (c) that the congestion in the federal courts will be thereby substantially relieved,
are still to be examined, even for legislative purposes. 18 Incidentally, it has been noticed that the interest in the federal diversity jurisdiction is subject to sectional influences; "in the Eastern
marked, "The most discerning cannot foresee how far the prevalency of a local
spirit may be found to disqualify the local tribunals for the jurisdiction of
national causes; whilst every man may discover that courts constituted like
those of some of the states, would be improper channels of the judicial authority of the union." THE FEDERtLIST, sipra note I, at 6o0, No. LXXXI (1788).
Thus, the statement, quoted in note io, that this "phase of the 'judicial
power of the United States' did not grow out of any serious defects of the
Confederacy nor did it anticipate glaring evils", would appear to be neither
verified nor even plausible. More judicious is the view of FRANKFURTER AND
LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT (1927) I0,that the federal
jurisdiction in cases of diverse citizenship was desired by its proponents, "Not
because of any a priori notions of political science but as a practical remedy
for the ineffectiveness of the Confederacy and the distintegrating tendencies of
state governments." The subject of "local prejudice" would seem to invite
scientific examination.
"The Norris bill, as finally amended, supra note 7.
In discussing the bill in the Senate, Senator Norris said that no particular hearings were necessary since it was "entirely a legal proposition","purely a question of practice that the lawyers on the Judiciary Committee
understand as well as do other attorneys." He further stated: "The only excuse and the only reason of which I know that has ever been given for the
present practice is prejudice in one State against the citizens of another State,
and the litigants go into a federal court in order to avoid that prejudice. If
such a condition existed 15o years ago, it has certainly disappeared now; there
is not anything to it; it is entirely a fiction, as I look at it." 69 CONG. REc.
6378 (1928).
Later discussion disclosed opposition to the bill on the part
of the bar; a report by the Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform of the
American Bar Association was submitted opposing the bill and requesting that
the "bill be recommitted to the Judiciary Committee in order that hearings may
be had". See 69 CONG. REC. 8o78, 8O8O (1928); (928) 53 A. B. A. REP.
424, 430, etc.

' See SEN. REP. No. 691 to accompany S. 4357, Limiting the Jurisdiction
of District Courts of the United States, 71st Cong. 2d Sess. May 2o, 1930.
See also SEN. REP. No. 626 to accompany S. 3151, Limiting the Jurisdiction of
District Courts of the United States, 71St Cong. Ist Sess. March 27, 1928.
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States there is no very large number of cases in the annual number
resting upon that ground of jurisdiction, but as you go West
and South you find an enlargement of causes turning upon citizenship and a lesser proportion of causes that fall under the other
general heads of jurisdiction dependent upon the subjectmatter." 17

While thus the winds of political opposition to the federal
diverse-citizenship jurisdiction blow prevailingly from the West
and South, the doctrinaire attack finds its distinguished advocate
in the distant East. Its salient points may be somewhat peremptorily sketched for our purposes in a series of propositions. i.
"Not inherent reasons but practical justifications explain the past
judiciary acts and must vindicate jurisdiction in the future."
"A priori reasoning", "unchanging political principles", and "the
prepossessions of the familiar", are "unsafe guides." "8 2. "A
powerful judiciary implies a relatively small number of judges."
Therefore, if the prestige of the federal courts is to be maintained, increase in federal judicial business cannot be met "merely
In a very interesting
17See 21 CoNG. REc. lo2x8 et seq. 1o22o (i8go).
study by Hannah G. Roach, dealing with sectional influences in Congress, the
author concludes that. "So long as sections retain their differences of geological
formation, natural resources, and economic interests, national policies must be
the product of compromises and adjustments between sections, and sectionalism,
or diversity in unity, must continue to be a fundamental condition of our national life." Roach, Sectionalism in Congress 187o to 189o (1g25) i9 Am. PoL.
ScL REv. 5oo, 526.
There seems to be some basis for the hypothesis that the state legislation
and the proposals in Congress intended to restrict or abolish diverse-citizenship
jurisdiction have been influenced, if not inspired, by sectional considerations.
Thus, the state statutes designed to prevent foreign corporations from removing
cases to the federal courts have typically occurred in southern, western, and
midwestern states, such as Arizona, Arkansas, Kentucky, Alabama, Oklahoma,
Missouri, Indiana, South Carolina, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa. See U. S. DEPARTMENT OF CommmamC, Report of the Commissioner of Corporationson State
Laws Concenting Foreign.Corporations (1915) II9, r49, 193. See also 2 SMImsoN, AmsacAx STATUTe LAW (1892) 215. And the recent proposals in Congress to curtail or abolish the federal jurisdiction in private civil actions have
come chiefly from western and midwestern representatives. For references
to the bills in question, submitted by Norris (Nebraska), Parks (Arkansas),
Walsh (Montana), Caraway (Arkansas), see supra note 7.
It will be recalled that the unconstitutionality of state anti-removal statutes was finally settled in the case of Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257
U. S. 529, 42 Sup. Ct. 188 (i2z). This has, of course, served to focus the
perennial attempts to limit the federal civil jurisdiction still more definitely in
Congress.
' 5See Frankfurter, op. cit. supra note 1o, at 506, 514; Frankfurter, The
Federal Courts (1929) 58 Nmv REPuBLIC 273, 274.
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by making more judges," but should "be stopped at its legislative
source" 19 3. The diverse-citizenship jurisdiction of the federal
judiciary is the basis of "state litigation in the federal courts", the
federal or non-federal character of litigation being determined
by the locus of legislative control.20 4. "The diversity cases
represent one of (the) heaviest items" in the federal court business. 21 As indicated in the Appendix to this article, this would
seem, prima facie at least, to be a rumor, which, like Mark Twain's
death, has been greatly exaggerated. The preliminary evidence is
that the diversity cases form a relatively small and decreasing
percentage of the total federal cases and maintain a fairly constant
ratio to the total civil litigation, state and federal. 5. The chief
justification for the jurisdiction, fear of local prejudice, is belied
by the changes in our national economic structure, which "no
longer allow the easy assumption that in the West and in the
South state jurors and judges are economic Ishmaelites".2 2 6. By
"Frankfurter, op. cit. supra note io, at 515, 516, 530.
'Ibid.. 517, 520.
"Ibid. 523.
INid. 522.
The proposition advanced to indicate the invalidity of the classical local
prejudice argument is, in sum, that the present need of the federal diversecitizenship jurisdiction, a factor present during the entire development of our

economic and financial structure since 1789, may be discounted by pointing to
the development itself. But the process by which a constant factor in the development can be thus discarded for purposes of present analysis is not indicated.
Naturally, such an argument may be turned to an opposite conclusion. It
is stated that "statistics on these matters are lacking, but there can be no
question of increase in the financing of western and southern development by
local capital", ibid. This, together with the dispersion of holdings and financial
agencies throughout the country, is taken as a showing that local prejudice
against foreign creditors is not easily to be assumed. Of course, on a matter
such as this, the specific information to be derived from statistics and other
sources is crucial. Undoubtedly, increase of population, development of invention, manufacture, and transportation and the like are basic conditions of financial growth. The point, however, is whether the rate of growth. of local as
well as foreign investment would have been as great as it has been, in the
absence of such potential control as the federal courts have exercised. Still
more, whether actual circumstances are such at the present time as to require
the continuance of the federal check upon local policy or prejudice. The
argument might well be tested in specific types of cases: thus, (I) suppose
that the federal courts had followed the state decisions in Iowa, for instance,
and thus had not established the interests of investors in municipal bonds as
they did in Gelpcke v. Dubuque, I Wall. 175 (U. S. 1864), how readily could
such bonds be marketed in the East or elsewhere, see note in (1893) 27 Am.
L. REV. 393 et seq.; or (2) suppose that the case of Terral v. Burke Construction Co., supra note 16, had been decided contrariwise and the states were thus
able to prevent foreign corporations from removing cases to the federal courts,
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giving non-residents a choice of forum denied to residents,
"diverse-citizenship jurisdiction has elements of unfairness" which
are accentuated by the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson-a doctrine
which, "with all its offspring, is michievous in its consequences,
baffling in its application, untenable in theory, and . . . a perver-

sion of the purposes of the framers of the First Judiciary Act."

23

what effect might this have upon the national economic structure, particularly in those businesses, such as insurance or intrastate transportation, which
involve the prospect of extensive litigation? It would seem that the argument requires a specific and verifiable analysis of matters such as these. Certainly, if the federal diverse-citizenship jurisdiction, be no longer significant
to the national financial or business structure, (the contrary would be indicated
by the large estimate of the number of cases involved given in the same argument, Frankfurter, op. cit. supra note 1o, at 523), it becomes a little difficult
to comprehend the substantial basis for the concern evinced in Congress as to
either the retention or the removal of the jurisdiction.
lIbid. 524, 526.
It is a large question, somewhat aside from the present discussion, how
far the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. i (U. S. I842), has tended towards
uniformity of law in this country. For the present, it may be noticed that in
the enunciation of the argument outlined in the text above, the assertion is
made that "Swift v. Tyson does not make for uniformity . . . Evidence is
wanting that state courts yield their owre law", Frankfurter, op. cit. spra note
1o, at 528. And in support of the statement, cases are cited in the footnote,
ibid. 529, n. i5o, to show that in New York and, following the New York doctrine, in Arkansas, Connecticut, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio and Wisconsin, the rule as to the effect of antecedent consideration declared in Swift
v. Tyson was not followed.
This treatment of the matter is fragmentary and inappropriate. Thus, there
is no indication that effort has been made to discriminate between those situations in which state courts have been faced with a choice between their own
precedents and Swift v. Tyson and those in which they were considering a
question not previously decided in the jurisdiction. Clearly, an indication that
state courts have been rather naturally reluctant to depart from their own
precedents despite the federal decisions will by no means show that Swift v.
Tyson did not make for uniformity in the latter situations. And, while it is
true that, literally speaking, the showing of a single subsequent exception to
Swift v. Tyson will indicate that it has not resulted in complete uniformity,
this is obviously to misconceive the problem. The question is not whether the
doctrine attained the monotonous perfection of uniformity but rather the degree to which it has tended to reduce uncertainty and inconsistency in the
development of law in this country. And this will be tested, not by the isolated
exceptions, but by their significance in the larger history of which they form
a part.
However, these and other general aspects of the problem must be left to
be more adequately canvassed at a later date. For the present, it is sufficient
to note the egregious limitations of the evidence even on the basis taken.
Presumably, the categorical negative that "evidence is wanting that state
courts yield their own law", in the first place, would need to be supported by a
complete showing of its application to all decisions involved in all jurisdictions, yet the evidence is ten cases from eight jurisdictions out of forty-eight.
In the second place, the evidence is in fact unrepresentative; although the eight
jurisdictions, in which it is intimated Swift v. Tyson was not followed, were
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not the only ones in which the broad dictum of that case was not always observed, see Jones, The Law of Collateral Securities (i88o) 14 AM. L. REv.
465, 485n, yet the trend of doctrine in the larger number of jurisdictions was
in accord with the federal decisions. For instance, in the leading Maryland
case, Maitland v. The Citizens' National Bank of Baltimore, 4o Md. 540, 562,
564, (1874), Judge Alvey stated:
"The leading American case upon this subject is that of Swift vs. Tyson,
16 Pet., I. In that case the Supreme Court of the United States, by Mr. Justice STORY, stated fully the grounds upon which the principle rests, that he who
receives a negotiable instrument, as a promissory note, in payment of, or as
collateral security for, a precedent debt, without other consideration, is a holder
for value, within the rule of protection against antecedent equities ....
"The principle thus asserted in Swift vs. Tyson, appears to have been
sanctioned and followed by the Courts in many of the leading commercial
States of the Union, as in Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, California,
Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, Louisiana, South Carolina, Rhode Island and Vermont, as will be seen by reference to the judicial reports of those States . . .
While, on the other hand, the Courts of New York, and those of some of
the other States, following the case of Bay vs. Coddington . . . have held
that it is not sufficient to protect the note in the hands of the holder, that he
received it merely as collateral security for a pre-existing debt, or even as
nominal or conditional payment of such debt, unless he had given some, new
consideration for it; that a note so taken is not received or negotiated in the
usual course of trade. But Chancellor KENT, who gave the opinion in Bay vs.
CoddingtoE, and which, upon the same reasons assigned by the Chancellor, was
affirmed in the Court of Errors, while stating the law in the text of his Commentaries, vol. 3, p. 81, in accordance with that opinion, has appended a note,
in which he said he was inclined to concur in the decision of Swift vs. Tyson,
as the plainer and better doctrine."
In the third place, it seems not improbable, therefore, that Swift v. Tyson
had some part in preparing the final triumph of the doctrine enunciated by Justice Story in §25 of the Negotiable Instruments Law even in the jurisdictions which have been placed in question, (New York, 1897; Arkansas, 1913;
Connecticut, 1897; Maine, 1917; Minnesota, 1913; Missouri, 19o5; Ohio, 19o2;

Wisconsin, 1917. See 5 UNIFoRm LAWS ANNOTATED, (1930), vii, 164). As the
draftsman of the Negotiable Instruments Law has stated, § 25 "abolishes the
rule in the leading case of Coddington v. Bay", CRAWFORD, NEGoTIABLE INSTRUmENTS LAw, ANNOTATED (Ist ed. 1897) 30.
Incidentally in the Commissioners' Note to Section 52 of the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, as in other
uniform acts, the general principle of uniformity inthe interpretation of the
act is expressly referred to Swift v. Tyson, 4 UNIFORm LAwS ANNOTATED
(1922) 77. Finally, it will appear from examination of the cases in the very
jurisdictions in question, that the actual decision in Swift v. Tyson was not
rejected in any of the eight jurisdictions, subject to the qualifications introduced in the New York cases adverted to below, while the wider diction of
Justice Story, was accepted in three of the eight states-Arkansas, Connecticut
and Minnesota- It is pertinent to refer briefly to the doctrinal evidence on
this last point for the period prior to the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
It is a somewhat elementary proposition that cases are to be read with
reference to their facts.

WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES (1894) C. II, 8

et seq. It may, therefore, be noticed that the decision of Swift v. Tyson was
on a certificate of division from the Southern District of New York as to

whether a bona fide indorsee of a bill of exchange, which had been received
in payment of an existing debt before maturity, is affected by the antecedent

equities. In delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court, Justice Story said:
"Assuming it to be true (which, however, may well admit of' some doubt from
the generality of the language), that the holder of a negotiable instrument is
unaffected with the equities between the antecedent parties, of which he has no
notice, only where he receives it in the usual course of trade and business for
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a valuable consideration, before it becomes due, we are prepared to say that

receiving it in payment of, or as security for a pre-existing debt, is according
Supra, at i9. Justice Catron,
in a concurring opinion, stated that he was "unwilling to sanction the intro-

to the known usual course of trade and business."

duction into the opinion of this Court (of) a doctrine aside from the case made

by the record, or argued by the counsel, assuming to maintain that a negotiable

note or bill pledged as collateral security for a previous debt, is taken by the
creditor in due course of trade." Ibid. 23.

It is, therefore, pertinent to distinguish, in a consideration of the reception
of the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson in state courts, between the decision and the
dictum or, in other words, between cases in which negotiable paper is received
in payment of an antecedent debt and those in which it is received as collateral
security therefor. Other types of situations could be distinguished, e. g., those
involving accommodation paper, but need not be considered for the present
purpose. With the distinction suggested in mind, it will be sufficient to cite
the more important leading cases in the several jurisdictions which have been
placed in question under an analysis suggesting the relation of these cases to
Swift v. Tyson:
I. Negotiable instrument received in payment of previous debt.
a. State decisions prior to 1842 in accord with the decision in Swift v.
Tyson: New York, Bank of St. Albans v. Gilliland, 23 Wend. 311 (N. Y.
i84o) ; Connecticut, Brush v. Scribner, ii Conn. 388 (1836), citing Payson v.
Coolidge, Fed. Cas. No. io86o (C. C., D. Mass. 1814), aft'd, Coolidge v. Payson, 2 Wheat. 66 (U. S. x817); Maine. Homes v. Smith, 16 Me. 177 (0839),
followed in Norton v. Waite, 2o Me. 175 (1841), in which Swift v. Tyson was
cited as authority for the doctrine.
b. State decisions prior to 1842 contrary to the decision in Swift v. Tyson
and reversed after 1842: Ohio, Riley and Van Amringe v. Johnson, 8 Ohio
527, 529 (I838), rev'd, Carlisle v. Wishart, ii Ohio 173 (842), expressly on
the authority of Swift v. Tyson. The court stated in the Carlisle case: "It is
believed that the law, as thus settled by the highest judicial tribunal in the
country, will become the uniform rule of all, as it now is of most of the states.
And in a country like ours, where so much communication and interchange exists between the different members of the confederacy, to preserve uniformity
in the great principles of commercial law, is of much interest to the mercantile
world." Supra at 191, 192.
c. Question first decided after 1842 in accord with decision in Swift v.
Tyson: Arkansas, Bertrand v. Barkman, 13 Ark. 15o (1852), expressly following Swift v. Tyson; Minnesota, Stevenson v. Heyland, ii Minn. I98 (1866),
citing Swift v. Tyson; lissouri, Fitzgerald v. Barker, 96 Mo. 661 (1888), following the federal cases; Wisconsin, Atchison v. Davidson, 2 Pin. 48 (Wis.
1847), citing Swift v. Tyson as authority.
II. Negotiable instrument received as collateral security for previous debt.
a. State decisions prior to 1842 contrary to the doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson, followed after 1842: New York, Coddington v. Bay, 2o Johns. 637
(18z2), followed in Stalker v. McDonald, 6 Hill 93 (N. Y. 1843), in which
Chancellor Walworth stated: "I have, therefore, thought it my duty to reexamine the principles upon which the decision of this court in Coddington v.
Bay, was founded, notwithstanding it was deliberately made, with the concurrence of, at least, one of the ablest judges who has ever adorned the Bench
of this State, and has been acquiesced in and followed by all the courts of the
State for more than twenty years. And I have done it not only out of respect to the decision actually made by the Supreme Court of the U. S. in the
case alluded to, but also because the opinion of the distinguished judge who
pronounced its decision, is of itself entitled to very great weight upon a question of commercial law; although what he said in that case respecting the transfer of a negotiable note as a mere security for the payment of an antecedent
debt, was not material to the decision of any question then before the court,
and is, therefore, not to be taken as a part of its judgment in that case." Supra
at 95.
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b. Question first decided after 184k contrary to doctrine of Swift v. Tyson: Malinc, Bramhall v. Beckett, 31 Me. 2o5 (i850), in which Swiftv. Tyson
is expressly referred to as a case in which "the point was not raised, and where
the decision turned upon other considerations"; in Smith v. Bibber, 82 Me.
34, i9 At. 89 (1869), the court refused to overrule the Bramhall case, bat
added: "If the question was an open one here, we should be inclined to adopt
the federal rule, as the one best sustained by principle and authority." Ohio,
Roxborough v. Messick, 6 Ohio St. 448 (1856), distinguished in Pitts v.
Foglesong, 37 Ohio St. 676 (1882), in a case involving an accommodation indorsement. In the Roxborough case, the court stated that "All that is said
in Swift v. Tyson . . . in regard to the rule to be adopted where negotiable
paper is taken as collateral security, for a pre-existing debt is obiter," ibid. 457.
Wisconsin, Cook v. Helms, 5 Wis. io7 (1856), in which the court followed the.
New York cases in preference to "some dicta in the opinion of Story, J., in
the case of Swift v. Tyson.
c. Question first decided after 1842 in accord with doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson: Connecticut, Bridgeport City Bank v. Welch, 29 Conn. 475 (i86I),
citing the case of Swift v. Tyson.
d. Dictum after 1842 contrary to Swift v. Tyson later overruled: Arkmsas, Exchange National Bank v. Coe, 95 Ark. 387, 127 S. W. 453 (I9IO), expressly overruling the dictum in the Bertrand v. Barkman case (1852), in which
the court had said: "But this question, as to the extinguishment of a preexisting debt, came up directly before the supreme court of the United States
in the case of Swift v. Tyson, (16 Peter R. 1), and it was held by the whole
court as sufficient to satisfy the rule, and this is in accordance with what we
think is the overwhelming current of decisions. Judge STORY, however, who
delivered the opinion of the court in that case, went out of the record and asserted beyond this, that a negotiable note or bill pledged as collateral security
would stand on the same footing as one purchased in market for money, or
taken in extinguishment of a previous debt. judge CATRON, however, in that
case dissented from all that was beyond the record, and subsequently Chancellor WALWORTH, in the case of Stalker v. McDonald, et al. (6 Hill R. 93),
examined in detail all the authorities referred to by Judge STORY to sustain his views, and shows very satisfactorily that they were, in a great degree,
misconceived." Supra at 16o, 161. In the Exchange National Bank case, it
was said: "The trend of modern decisions is in favor of the rule adopted in
the federal courts as tending to promote uniformity in the different jurisdictions. This is considered important, in view of the increased dealings between
the citizens of different states and because the courts of the national government do not recognize the decisions of the state courts on the question." Minnesota, In Becker v. Sandusky Bank, i Minn. 311, 319 (1856), Sherburne, J.,
stated in a dictum: "I commenced an examination of this case under a full
conviction that the answer would also be bad as to any equities between the
original parties prior to the endorsement; that the law was as laid down by
Judge Story in Suift against Tyson, 16 Peters' Reps., i. But a careful examination of the authorities leads me to doubt the correctness of that opinion upon
this point. The authorities cited by Judge Story to sustain his view upon this
point in that case will be found, with a very few exceptions, based upon an
endorsement of negotiable paper, as payment of an antecedent debt, and not as
collateral security for the payment. it should be recollected that in the case of
Stift vs. Tyson, the bill of exchange was endorsed in paynwnt of an antecedent debt, and not as collateral security; and that so far as the opinion relates
to an assignment as collateral security, it is foreign to the question which was
before the Court, and 'its weight of reason must depend upon what it contains.' See Carroll vs. Lessee of Carroll et al., 16 How. U. S. Rep., 287. But
even as the mere dictum of Judge Story, I would not presume to dissent from
it without very strong reasons or the support of high authority. The opinion,
however, has been reviewed by Chancellor Walworth in the case of Stalker
v's. McDoiald, 6 Hill Rep., 93, in which it seems to me to be clearly shown
that the dictum of Judge Story cannot be supported as sound law." In Rose-
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mond v. Graham, 54 Minn. 323, 56 N. W. 38 (1893), in which it was stated
that "The question has never been decided in this court", the federal rule was
followed: "This being a matter of general commercial law, the rulings in the
federal courts will everywhere follow that of the supreme court, as above
indicated, irrespective of what the state courts may declare to be the law in
their respective jurisdictions. Diverse rules of law, affecting ordinary commercial transactions, cannot be finally declared and enforced by different courts
within the same jurisdiction without resulting evils too great to be disregarded.
Without assuming now to determine as to which side of the question is supported by the better reason, it is considered that our decision should be such
that there shall be but one rule of law recognized and enforced in all the courts
in this state." Missouri, The dictum in Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. io6 (1853),
contrary to the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, was reversed by dicta in Grant v.
Kidwell, 30 Mo. 455 (i86o), and Boatman's Saving Institution v. Holland, 38
Mo. 49 (1866), in accord with the doctrine. The holding in these cases, however, was not followed and the earlier doctrine of Goodman v. Simonds was
sustained in the case of Loewen v. Forsee, 137 Mo. 29, 38 S. W. 712 (1897),
on the authority of Railroad Co. v. National Bank, 102 U. S. 14 (1879).
It should be remarked that the "subtle refinements" in the New York decisions, which have been said to have resulted from the rule in Coddington v.
Bay, 2o Johns. 637 (N. Y. i8n), CRAWFORD, op. cit. supra, at 32, did not involve the principle applied in Bank of St. Albans v. Gilliland, sapra, but rather
the question as to what facts were sufficient to- constitute the receiving of a
negotiable instrument in "payment" of an existing debt. The only New York
decision to the contrary, which has been found, is that in Rosa v. Brotherson, Io
Wend. 85 (N. Y. 1833), which was explained and distinguished in Smith v.
Van Loan, 16 Wend. 659 (N. Y. 1837). See the excellent summary by Finch,
J., in Mayer v. Heidelbach, 123 N. Y. 332, 25 N. . 416 (189o). Indeed, in
Coddington v. Bay, it was said by Woodworth, J., that to constitute a holder
who had taken a bill for an antecedent debt a holder for value, "something
must be paid in money or property, or some existing debt satisfied thereby,
or some new responsibility incurred in consequence of the transfer," loc. cit.
supra, at 646. As explained in the case of Homes v. Smith, supra, in New
York, a bill or note taken for a pre-existing debt was "not payment, unless
expressly agreed to be received in payment." In other states, such as Maine,
negotiable paper received for a pre-cxisting debt was payment of it, unless the
contrary was made to appear. And, therefore, while "in New York, the taking of such paper, if not collected, would occasion no loss," in such jurisdictions "it would cause the loss of the whole debt." From this and the various
exceptions which were grafted upon the rule in Coddington v. Bay, the confusion in the New York law sprang. But, as indicated, it does not disturb
the conclusion that, before 1842, the decision in Swift v. Tyson had been anticipated in the New York decisions.
The foregoing analysis could, of course, be expanded by the inclusion of
other jurisdictions, but considerations of space and simplicity preclude. For
the same reasons, other instances of conflict between federal and state decisions, referred to in the note cited above, are not here considered. However,
in view of the fact that Alabama decisions under the case of Fenouille v. Hamilton, 35 Ala. 319 (1859), involving the problem here discussed, are cited to
show that the Alabama courts continued to follow their decisions thereunder,
despite the decision in Oates v. First National Bank, ioo U. S. 239 (z879),
it is of interest to note that there was no conflict between the two cases, as
seems to be suggested. In the Oates case, collateral security was given under
an agreement to extend the time of payment of an antecedent debt, and the
decision accorded with the dictum in the Fenouille case. In general, the Alabama courts accepted the decision in Swift v. Tyson, e. g., Bank of Mobile v.
Hall, 6 Ala. 639 (1844), expressly followed Swift v. Tyson, but declined to follow Story's dictum in cases involving the receipt of negotiable instruments as
collateral security for previous debts.
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The results of the preceding partial analysis of the decisions in the eight
jurisdictions, in which it is said, in the note cited, "state courts expressly refused to follow Swift v. Tyson', may be briefly summarized. In general, no
decision by the courts in these jurisdictions has been found, expressly refusing
to follow the actual decision in Swift v. Tyson. On the contrary, the law
of New York, Maine, and Connecticut was settled in accord with that decision
prior to 1842; in Arkansas, Minnesota, Missouri, and Wisconsin, Swift v.
Tyson was explicitly followed in the leading cases after 1842; and, in Ohio,
a case prior to 1842 was overruled, expressly in order to bring the law into
conformity with Swift v. Tyson.
Further, in cases involving the receipt of negotiable instruments as collateral securities for antecedent debts, there is evidence that even the dictum of
Justice Story had substantial influence. In Connecticut, the doctrine of Swift
v. Tyson was followed, while in Arkansas and Minnesota and for a period in
Missouri, the earlier dicta, subsequent to Swift v. Tyson, were overruled, so
as to bring the law into conformity with the doctrine of that case. In five
states, Justice Story's dictum was not followed just because it was dictum,
either in view of prior decisions, as in New York, or since the New York
doctrine was preferred, as in Maine, Missouri, Ohio and Wisconsin. And, if
space permitted, it could be shown that, even in these jurisdictions, the dictum
of Justice Story was not without effect, as indicated by decisions carving
various exceptions out of the rule in Coddington v. Bay.
It remains to remark that, on the effect of Swift v. Tyson as to the position of a holder receiving a negotiable instrument in payment of an antecedent debt, only one of the ten state decisions cited by the author is specifically in point, and this case, Bertrand v. Barkman, supra, expressly followed
Swift v. Tyson. And, on the effect of Story's dictum as to the situation where
collateral security was received, four or at most five of the ten decisions cited
are technically relevant. Thus, McBride v. Farmer's Bank of Salem, 26
N. Y. 450 (1863), turned upon whether the assignee of a foreign payee bank

could recover the proceeds of a note from a foreign collecting bank in the
New York courts; Cary v. White, 52 N. Y. 138 (x873), presented a question
of priorities under the recording act, and did not involve a negotiable instrument; in Bertrand v. Barkman, supra, the instrument was received in payment
of an antecedent debt and the court followed Swift v. Tyson in the decision
although not Justice Story's dictum in the dicta; in Becker v.* Sandusky City
Bank, supra, the equities claimed against the holder were subsequent to the
indorsement; and, in Cook v. Helms, mspra, although the facts do not clearly
appear, the court apparently based its decision on the ground that the holder was
not bona fide. And, in any event, the case of Webster v. Howe Machine Co.,
54 Conn. 394, 8 Atl. 482 (I886), is not indicative of the situation in Connecticut, as the liability of an accommodation acceptor, reident in New York, of
a bill payable in New York, was involved and the court stated that it applied
the law of New York as the lex foci contractus. The fragmentary showing,
such as it is, that Swift v. Tyson had no persuasive effect in state courts,
therefore, rests principally upon dicta. It is, of course, true that dicta have
had at times potent influence upon the course of decision and, as such, deserve
attention. It is, nevertheless, interesting to note that the battle is apparently
waged with dicta, not the most reputable form of opinion evidence, against the
dictum of Justice Story. The visceral reaction, one might say, is to vocal behavior.
The foregoing analysis will perhaps have suggested that Swift v. Tyson
has not been without influence in the development of commercial law in this
country. But, at the same time, this is only a limited, theoretical and partial
sampling of a large development, which has, by reason of the pattern considered, left completely out of account the dominating institutional influences. It
is not rashly to be taken as conclusive on the validity or invalidity of "the
federal common law." The matter is one which begs for serious attention,
if only that the much abused case of Swift v. Tyson may not be further misunderstood.
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7. Ergo, "Is there not ample basis for re-examining the present
jurisdiction in the federal courts in cases where there is not even
the warrant of enforcing a federal right?"

24

It is not to the purpose here to appraise the detail of the foregoing argument, although to avoid the inference of tacit consent,
certain specific difficulties on major points are alluded to in the
notes 25 and the Appendix. What is noticed, however, is the fact
that it is possible to formulate a similarly consistent and persuasive
argument to the opposite conclusion. The various propositions
of such an argument have indeed been stated 26 and may be outlined as follows: i. The basic question is the promotion of the
administration of justice, not political compromise. 2. The maintenance of its traditional jurisdiction is essential to the prestige
of the federal judiciary; by additions to its personnel and improvements in procedure the federal judiciary should be accommodated
to its proper business and not the business to the traditional organization. 3. The diverse citizenship cases, being provided for in
the Constitution, are federal, not state cases, and are, therefore,
properly cognizable in the federal courts. 4. "No single element
in our governmental system has done so much to secure capital
for the legitimate development of enterprises throughout the West
and South as the existence of Federal courts there, with a jurisFrankfurter, op. cit. supra note 10, at 522, 525. He also states, ibid. 525,
"The right to remove to the federal court a litigation between non-residents
in a state court will not survive analysis"; and that "it is hard to justify any
retention of federal receivership except as to interstate enterprises", ibid. 526.
The point of view summarized in the text was set forth upon several occasions. See, in addition to the article cited in note IO, Frankfurter, The Federal Courts (1929) 58 NEw REPUBLIc 273; Frankfurter, Address before the
New Jersey State Bar Association (1928-9) YEAR BOOK, NEW JERs EY STATE
BAR Ass'N 99; FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE BUSNESS OF THE SUPREME
COURT (I97) 292.

See especially supra notes 22, 23 and also I, 12 and 13 on the historical
aspects of the argument.
"Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms in the Administration of Justice in
the Federal Courts (1922) 47 A. B. A. REP. 250, 258; (1922) 8 A. B. A. J.
6oi, 604; Stone, Fifty Years Work of the United States Supreme Court (1928)
53 A. B. A. REP. 259, 263; (1929) 8 ORE. L. REV. 248-68; Newlin, Proposed
Limitations upon Our Federal Courts (1929) 15 A. B. A. J. 401, 403; Report
of Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform of the American Bar Ass'n
(1928) 53 A. B. A. REP. 419, 424, 430; RoSENTERG, SWAINE AND WALKER.
CORPORATE REORGANIZATION AND THE FEDERAL COURT (1924) v. 53. And see
the general summary in Brown, The Jurisdictim of the Federal Courts based
on Diversity of Citizenship (1929) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 179.
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diction to hear diverse citizenship cases." 27 By depriving the federal courts of this jurisdiction, "a serious blow will be directed
at the financial structure which has been built up in a long course
of years." 28 5. The jurisdiction is not unfair; it minimizes
actual discrimination flowing from existent local prejudice and
extends an equal privilege to all citizens involved in litigation
outside the state of residence. 6. The diverse citizenship jurisdiction, far from producing legal diversity, is essential to the
harmonious and uniform development of law in this country, particularly in the federal courts. 7. In sum, the proposals to restrict
the federal jurisdiction in civil cases to which the United States
is not a party contemplate "the first step toward a system, alien
to Anglo-Saxon ideas of civil liberty, of having one kind of law
and procedure governing the rights of individuals among themselves and another controlling rights growing out of their relations to the Government." 29
These arguments, pro and contra, are propounded, not as a
demonstration of the merits or demerits of the federal "diversity"
jurisdiction, but as an experimental sample of a familiar type of
theoretical discussion. Some time since, with more particular
reference to the traditional "vested rights" theories of the "conflicts of laws", an effort was made to outline the scientific limitations of analysis, stated in metaphorical broad principles and inadequately verified as to their practical purposes and effects.ao Without rehearsing the theoretical aspects of the matter, it may here
be noticed that both arguments as to the federal diverse-citizenship jurisdiction, outlined above, present difficulties in part analogous to those there noticed. In the first place, a complicated problem of the administration of justice is oversimplified; no sufficient
account is taken of regional variations, of possible diversity
according to type of case, trade practice or legal system. In the
O'Taft, op. cit. sutpra note 26, at 259.

Report of Committee on Jurisprudenceond Law REform, supra note 26,
at 435.

' Ibid. 432.
' Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Cmtflict of Laws (1928) 37
YALE L. J.468, 476 et seq.
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second place, the crucial items of controversy are in effect anticipated,-such as the primary facts as to the actual distribution of
the judicial business in question between federal and state courts,
the existence and effects of local prejudice in the administration
of justice, the actual correlation between the federal jurisdiction
and national uniformity, particularly of commercial law, and so
forth. In the third place, the purpose is not ascertainment but
persuasion,-the cogent formulation of intuitive opinion based
at best upon an unexposed individual experience. In sum, both
arguments betray the masterful genius of the advocate, by which
detail is subordinated to compulsive theory and theory appears
more than the tentative sublimation of research. Of this, as art,
there can be no criticism; for scientific purposes, however, this,
the usual literary mode of legal discourse is not the most apposite,
since it is not explicitly calculated to observe and explain representative phenomena.
At the least, the scientific impotence of uncorroborated theory
and individual opinion is suggested by our experimental sample.
As Doctor Johnson observed in the debates on the Constitution,
"The controversy must be endless whilst Gentlemen differ in the
grounds of their arguments." 3' In the present instance, the vital
parts of the argument are the premises of fact, and these are a
disputatious bed of Kilkenny cats. Thus, two sets of proposals,
comparable in logical cogency and legislative plausibility each supported by authority and ardently vindicated by actual interests, can
be set forth with diametric premises and conclusions. It is enough
to shake the most hardy faith in the infallibility of mere dialectic
or personal intuitive experience as a means to truth. Until a
more secure basis of inference is provided, there can scarce be a
present choice between the competing views, which is not controlled
by immediate interest or intuitive prejudice. Ultimately, there
appears no solution but by war, historical attrition, majority rule
or compromise, or objective study.

M3

HuNT, op. cit. mtpra note 2 (I9O2),

at 312.
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II

A brief examination of the contemporary discussion, political,
historical and doctrinaire, as to the jurisdiction of the federal
courts in controversies between citizens of different states, has
thus led to the conclusion that it has been conducted predominantly
on the level of individual, intuitive opinion. For reasons indicated,
it is proposed that effort should be made to provide the basis for
impersonal analysis and verification. The present purpose is to
suggest the lines which an inquiry looking in this direction might
well take, at least in its initial stages. The proposal has certain
implications which first need to be specified.
In the first place, the study proposed is not de lege ferenda.
The subject-matter is chosen, not with any view to proposals of
immediate reform, but in the texture of a more general study of
the administration of justice. It involves no designs upon the
present distribution of judicial business in either the federal or
state courts other than to subject it to scientific study. Neither
the abolition nor the maintenance of the "diversity" jurisdiction
of the federal courts is advocated, but only the disinterested
analysis of its phenomena. The issue does not need to be elaborated. The history of science suggests that in the long run the
study of correlations is as fruitful as the study of ameliorative
devices. It warrants patient curiosity in the analysis and verification of phenomena as well as the indulgence of otherwise laudable, reformist motivation in legal research.
Hence, in the second place, the study, being disinterested in
reform, is not projected as a stage in the propagandization of particular ideas. It seeks to ascertain, not to promulgate. The
validity of this choice in scientific work is generally recognized, in
32
theory if not always in practice.
"Significant advance in the social sciences requires that we keep rigorously
apart the modes by which we arrive at tentative truths and working hypotheses,
and the process of securing their acceptance with such modification and qualification as a world of compromise requires. To borrow, as is the custom these
days, the language of the business world, it is vital not to confuse the production of ideas with their distribution. The two involve different processes,
different methods, different atmospheres, above all, different temperaments.
It is, I believe, fatal to the development of new ideas to pursue them in an
atmosphere and with the processes that predominantly reflect a desire to 'put
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Nor is the proposed study conceived as practical in still a third
and related sense. Its immediate purpose is scientific observation
and not necessarily professional prediction. There is a difference
not always duly noticed. Roughly speaking, the scientific interest
is in the specific as an instance of a potential typification, whereas
the technical problem is to apply the formula to the specific. The
concern of the lawyer, as craftsman or advocate in the practice
of his art, is necessarily with the disposition of specific cases,
typically by reference to anticipated judicial decision. Legal
science may and predominantly does adopt an analogous point of
view, doubtless for the reason that it is still in professional swaddling-clothes. However, the advantage of science is that this point
of view is not compulsory. As is elsewhere suggested, 33 the
scientific interest may appropriately be directed to description,
to the study of verified correlations of human conduct; it may
well disclaim the prognostication of individual results in given
cases. Furthermore, it is not limited to the appellate decision as a
point of reference in prediction: it may study the effects as well
as the conditions of judicial decision; it may take as its primary
institutional focus, not the court, but the lawyer, the legislator, the
client, or the social institution. Hence, for much the same reasons
that it is preferred to the reformist point of view, the scientific
view-point is preferred to the professional,-namely, because it
is less trammelled by practical exigencies, less restricted by tradition, and, therefore, more hopeful of long results. These results
over' ideas. Those who have the aptitude for discovery, for invention, for
fashioning new hypotheses are seldom equipped to secure their practical applications. An indispensable condition for fruitful theoretical research is the
right kind of intellectual climate for important ideas to come to life. That
means a total lack of the urgencies of the immediate and a freedom from

worry about all the accommodations and compromises that become pertinent

when ideas are to be formulated for acceptance. This may all sound very abstract, but it expresses the deepest conviction I have regarding the most concretely indispensable condition for seminal or even significant thinking in law.
There must be freedom from pressure for results, for approval by counittees
or conferences or foundations, for satisfying this hope and allaying that fear,
which necessarily and properly condition the whole psychological atmosphere
under which the work of securing acceptance for ideas proceeds." Frankfurter,
Conditionsfor and the Aims and Methods of Legal Research (193o) 15 IOWA L.

(ig3o) 6 Am. L. ScnooL REV. 663, 667.
Yntema, The Purview of Research in the Administration of Justice

REv. i29;
33

(ig3i) 16 IOWA L. REV. 337.
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may well be of the highest significance to the profession, even as
a basis of prediction, but this possibility does not necessarily control the methods of science. In this regard, the apparently more
impractical point of view becomes practical.
Let us not misunderstand. In yet another sense, the proposed study is intensely practical. It proposes to ascertain the
actual and not merely to embroider the theoretical. Thus, it involves the most intimate integration of theory and practice.
III
The orientation of the study proposed is in the administration of justice. More specifically, it has to do with the distribution
of litigation. It is, therefore, not a study of the federal diversecitizenship jurisdiction as such, but rather a study of jurisdiction
by reference to a selected experimental sample, consisting of the
types of civil cases concurrently cognizable in federal and state
courts. In other words, the purpose is to begin with the experimental testing of method and theory. What this signifies must
be more specifically developed in the ensuing discussion, but at this
juncture the points of contrast with recognized fields of study may
conveniently be noticed.
On the one hand, analogous studies could be envisaged, relating specifically to the jurisdictional system either of a particular
state or states or of the federal judiciary.34 Studies of this
'The information available as to the distribution of civil litigation in this
country is scattered and highly fragmentary. For the federal courts, the studies,
which have thus far been made, have been historical in character and are principally concerned with the work of the Supreme Court. The outstanding monograph is by FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT
(1927), reprinted from (924)
REv. 35, 325, 587, 1046; (1926)

38 HARV. L. REv. IOO5; (1925) 39 HARV. L.
40 HARv. L. REv. 431, 834, iiio, in which the

history of the various Judiciary Acts is considered from the point of view of
the Supreme Court and with particular reference to the printed legislative

materials.

WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1922)

is a mine of historical information, particularly as to the more important decisions of the Supreme Court. The more recent work of the Court is summarized in HANKIN AND HANKIN, UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1928-29
(1929) ; iNd., PROGRESS OF THE LAiV IN THE U. S. S'PREME COURT 1929-30

(I930) ; Frankfurter and Landis, The Supreme Court wider the Judiciary Act
of 1925 (1928) 42 H.Av. L. REv. I; Frankfurter and Landis, Business of the
Supreme Court at October Term, 1928 (1929) 43 HAgv. L. REV. 33; Frankfurter and Landis, Busiess of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1929,
(193o) 44 HARV. L. REV. 3. The absence of detailed monographic studies of
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nature, however, would not be to the present purpose and for two
chief reasons. First, as already explained, the present study is
not conceived with a primary view to the reform of either the
federal or a state judiciary; hence, it need not accept the limitation
to a peculiar system of courts which such a purpose would necessarily require. Second, it is believed that the concurrent administration of civil justice in the federal courts cannot be safely isolated
for the purposes in hand from that in the respective state courts,
or vice versa. The fact that the concurrent litigation to be examined in each state, the substantive law and procedure and the
officials concerned,-judges, lawyers, and juries,---come in large
part from the same geographic and economic area argues strongly
for the possibility of significant relations between two concurrent
systems of justice, inviting comparative study, and renders a study
of the subject with reference to either system alone prospectively
lop-sided.3 5
individual district courts, to which Frankfurter and Landis draw attention, op.
cit. supra, at 52n., and of a competent system of federal judicial statistics, to
which they repeatedly refer, ibid. 53n. 22o, 221, 248, has precluded the systematic
treatment of the system of the federal courts as a whole.
The literature for the administration of justice in the state courts is still
more sporadic and scattered. For the more general references on the subject,
such as there are, see WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES oF JUDICIAL ADmINISTRATIOx
(1929) at 616 et seq. and 630; Marshall, The Beginnings of Judicial Statistics
in RicE, STATIsTics IN SOCIAL STUDIES (193o) 89 et seq.; Yntema, op. cit. sMtpra
note 33, at 358, 359.
'Aside from the fact that the federal district courts and the state courts
concurrently operate in the same geographical areas and so are subject to much
the same general conditions, there are specific points at which similarities between the federal and state trial courts may be anticipated: (I) Divergencies
in the personnel of the court are in some degree lessened by the fact that both
federal and state judges are rcsidents of the state and presumably imbued with
the training and traditions of the local bar. (2) Similarly, differences which
might otherwise exist between the federal and the state bar are to a large
extent obviated through the fact that litigation in both federal and state courts
is very largely handled by the local bar and, in particular types of cases, often
by the same attorneys. (3) To a degree, cultural divergencies which might
otherwise appear in the character of the jury are likewise lessened by the fact
that they are drawn from the same region. (4) Save on specific questions,
the effect of the "conformity" rule is to remove in a large degree the differences which might otherwise exist in the substantive law; for the most part
the federal and state courts decide in accordance with the same statutes and
precedents. (5) The same is true to some degree of procedural practices.
Thus, not only is the litigation in the federal and state courts of a particular state drawn from .the same institutional sources and geographic area,
but there is also sufficient relation between the federal and state judicial systems
as such, to make it not .only possible but desirable in the study of the distribution of litigation to regard the litigation in each state as a unit.
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On the other hand, the subject-matter to be studied is of a
character intimately related to the more general fields of legal
procedure and, more especially, to what is known as the "conflicts
of laws". Like the latter subject, it concerns choice of court and
choice of law but in situations of two systems in a single area
instead of two systems in two geographical areas. Furthermore,
the inquiry is not only as to the technical basis of jurisdiction but
also why the case is brought to the particular court. Thus, attention is in a degree fixed upon the administration of justice by
courts and lawyers; the problem is to ascertain types primarily
in the official activity studied and to refer to them socio-economic
institutional factors. The converse method of referring official
activity to systematically ascertained, non-official, socio-economic
types is one which holds promise but is not adapted, initially at
least, to the problem in hand.
This focus of investigation serves to indicate somewhat the
levels at which information should be sought. Four such levels
may be distinguished: first, the formal published sources, the
statutes and reports; second, the formal written sources, the records of courts; third, informal information as to official activity
of judges, lawyers, juries and other officers of justice; fourth,
informal information as to non-official activities affected. The
more usual type of legal study, limited in general to the level of the
statute and the appellate report,--as is being more fully indicated
elsewhere,--would be highly hypothetical on crucial aspects of
actual practice. 36 The same applies, only in less degree, to studies
which extend to the official records, a valuable but not too eloquent
source of information. At the least, an effort to probe the realities of such things as the choice of forum should reach as far as
the lawyer's office, in view of the fact that the technical decision
there takes place. Hence, one aspect of the problem is methodically to obtain and utilize the informal records or other information available to lawyers. Necessarily, the results of a study of the
three first levels of information will need to be correlated with
non-official phenomena. The present inquiry, however, is not
Yntema, op. cit. supra note 33, at 348 et seq.
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directed to the first-hand investigation of such phenomena, save
insofar as they fall within its focus. For the rest, it will perforce
rely upon the results of other investigations.
Parenthetically, a possible confusion of ideas may be noticed
at this point. A study of the administration of justice which rejects the theoretical formulation of intuition as a methodology
does not by hypothesis exclude opinion evidence. The point is
important; the difference is between erecting an inverted theoretical pyramid upon a more or less narrow, individual and cryptic,
intuitive experience, on the one hand, and, on the other, utilizing
the testimony of competent observers secured under proper conditions and for appropriate purposes. The utility of the latter
method of investigation is writ large upon our judicial and legislative history. In the study proposed, there are certain points on
which the opinion of those responsible for decision is the most
direct source of information, e. g., with respect to the grounds of
choice of forum. Such opinions can be secured in sufficient instances to be representative, with reference to points of fact concerning specific, actual cases, from expert lawyers and with relative
objectivity and comparability. In a case such as this, it would
be unscientific to disregard the participant expert and to rely solely
37
upon inference from less immediate conditioning factors.
' The term "opinion evidence" is used in the general sense of record of
opinion or judgment, whether as to particular facts or more comprehensive situations. It should be noted, however, that the distinction commonly made between such "subjective evidence" and what is called "objective evidence" is one
of degree of detail and not of kind. The unsatisfactory nature of the distinction between the two may readily be illustrated. Thus, for example, if I see
a man raise a gun, see a puff of smoke, hear a report, see another man in the
line of fire fall, smell his blood, etc., is the evidence of my senses "subjective"
or "objective"? Again, if the next day, I read in the newspaper an item as
to the homicide, is this a "subjective" or an "objective" datitn? Or if the
prosecuting attorney decides to prosecute in view of the evidence of witnesses,
is he acting on "subjective" or "objective" data? Will the indictment which
is then drawn up be "subjective" or "objective' in its scientific character?
Will the evidence put in at the trial, the instructions of the judge, the verdict
of the jury, be scientifically "subjective" or "objective"? Will the loss to the
widow be "subjective" or "objective"?
To be more specific, is the pleading of an attorney stating his client's
case or, even further, the opinion of a judge rendering judgment, perhaps along
lines suggested in the attorney's brief, or the docket entries, made by the clerk
of court, "subjective" or "objective" evidence as to the facts in the case?
It would seem that any and all of the foregoing items can be described,
as one pleases, as either "objective" or "subjective". Even an opiniom as to
whether some prospective course of events is desirable or will occur, will be

896

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

The fact is that the lawyer plays an important role, not only
in the administration of justice generally, but in the distribution of
litigation. In the first place, a possible legal controversy first
comes into definite contact with the wheels of justice typically in
the lawyer's office; in a large number of instances, as to the proportional significance of which there is little definite information,
it is there settled or otherwise disposed of. In the second place,
not only does the lawyer normally participate in a decision to litigate, but he in some degree determines the time and, if more than
one court is open, the place as well. At times, the choice of forum,
which of necessity is largely the lawyer's province, may be between
different courts of a single system, e. g,--of law and equity, of
general or special jurisdiction,-or between the courts of different
states, as well as between the federal and state courts in a given
state. In all these situations, between which there are strong
analogies from the viewpoint of the distribution of litigation, the
lawyer, therefore, becomes a focal point of as much or even more
under certain conditions the most "objective" in its nature. The conclusion
is that an "objective", meaning a reliable, dation is one which is conceived to
be more pertinent to a given inquiry for a given purpose than others which are
described as "subjective".
This "objective-subjective" futility may be avoided by focusing upon the
definition of the sources of information which should be employed in investigation and more particularly upon the establishment of the precautions which

should be observed in the utilization of all evidence for scientific purposes. Certain of the more important precautions may be suggested. First, the sample,
record or opinion, should be representative, not individual. Second, the record
or opinion should, if possible, be secured in an objective setting; thus statements made arguendo, as in political debate, need to be verified or discounted.
Third, the record or opinion should relate to a specific rather than a general
subject-matter-if possible to concrete cases rather than large issues of belief.
Fourth, the record or opinion should be expert; it should evidence the conclusions of individuals, not merely theoretically competent, but who are themselves experienced with the point of inquiry. Fifth, records or opinions utilized
as a basis of inference should be comparable, both as to the experience of
those from whom they proceed and as to the specific subject-matter to which
they relate. And, of course, no matter what the character of the evidence,
unwarranted inferences are to be avoided.
The difficulty which is sometimes felt as to contemporary opinion evidence
is, in part, due to failure to observe these precautions or inability at times to
secure sufficiently representative opinion, in part to a hasty prepossession in
favor of the written, official record. In this we may observe the influence of
historical technique, which has sanctified the document because it almost invariably has no other contemporary source of information. But it should be
obvious that there is no particular virtue in the written word as historical evidence, other than that it is more likely to be preserved. What is needed are not
inflexible rules for the exclusion of historical evidence, but competent and comprehensive methods of search and evaluation.
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significance than the court. Both, indeed, may be the actors in
a drama, the major lines of which are written by more primitive
socio-economic forces. But even so, it is essential to ascertain
their practices, which, in the case of the lawyer, are not typically
represented in the reports or records.
The inquiry in mind is thus simply regarded as one of the
administration of justice. With equal propriety, it could be generally formulated in a political or behaviorist setting. The suggested
view-point is chosen, however, not because it is believed to be
intrinsically distinguishable from the alternatives, but for quite
incidental reasons. For one thing, the alternatives seem scarcely
to advance the issue. It may be said that law is in a high sense
political,-"legislative in its grounds", to use the phrase of Mr.
Justice Holmes, 3 8 -or that it has to do with human conduct, and
there is virtue in so saying. These are at present general antidotes
to formalism in legal study, but, once truly admitted, their analytical power is spent. They do not enable us to discriminate, being
general, and serve no more than to preface the basic problem of
detailed analysis. Moreover, the alternatives are liable to misconstruction. The formulation in terms of politics might perhaps
seem to traditionally law-conscious minds to suggest the drawing
of a distinction, which to us seems false, between the legal and
political study of the administration of justice. 39 And for
HoLsEs, THE CoMMaoN LAW (1881) 35.
'There seems to be a difference of opinion as to whether proposals relat-

ing to the federal jurisdiction in diverse-citizenship cases present legal or political questions. Senator Norris, in explaining why no hearing was had on his
bill to abolish the jurisdiction (supra note i5), described it as "entirely a legal
proposition", 69 CONG. Rac. 6378 (i928). On the other hand, according to
Frankfurter, the definition of the federal jurisdiction by Congress in the Judiciary Acts involves "issues of the very stuff of American politics to be settled
or avoided by compromises of one generation only to reappear in the next.
They are not technical issues nor within the special province of lawyers. The
formulation of the compromises demands legal skill, and of a high order. But
the bases of adjustment must be available by statesmen and ought both to enlist and satisfy public understanding." Opt. cit. s.pra note Io,at Soo.
As suggested in the text, the problems of federal diverse-citizenship jurisdiction may be described as political, but not in a sense which, for scientific
purposes, distinguishes them from legal problems. For such purposes, the point

of view suggested long since by Mr. Justice Holmes is taken, namely, that
the law, though logical in form, is in substance based upon political considerations. As is stated in THE COMMON LAW: "Every important principle which
is developed by litigation is in fact and at bottom the result of more or less
definitely understood views of public policy; most generally, to be sure, under
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reasons that we do not understand, the formulation in terms of
human behavior appears to evoke in certain quarters images of
"visceral reactions" (perhaps by a hasty limitation of behaviorism
to the theories of such as J. B. Watson) ,40 and the analysis that is
proposed is not essentially in physiological terms. In any event,
each of the three formulations may be taken to prescribe the same
end,--which seems to us of far greater importance than the general terminological setting chosen,-of fixing inquiry upon actual
human conduct, its conditions and interrelations, in lieu of upon
the theorization of intuition or opinion. The formulation in terms
of the administration of justice at least suggests that the terms
and propositions of analysis to be verified are chosen in the context
of the subject-matter studied,-a suggestion which we prefer to
that of borrowing from allied fields, however closely related.
With these observations in mind, the problems of analysis
may be more directly considered.
IV
The study is of the distribution of litigation. And it is to
be made by reference to observed phenomena. The major analytical problems involved in this proposal have to do with (a) the
choice of standards of measurement, (b) the sample to be studied,
its basis of selection and convenient limits, (c) the segregation of
types within the sample, (d) the statement of mass or typical
dimensions or trends within the phenomena, (e) the hypothetical
analysis of factors and the correlation of the ratios or trends
determined with these factors.
The first problem is, therefore, to determine upon a technique
by which types and standards of measurement can be eventually
our practices and traditions, the unconscious result of instinctive preferences
and inarticulate convictions, but none the less traceable to views of public policy in the last analysis." Loc. cit. slpra note 38. This point of view has the
incidental advantage of not appearing to draw a distinction, which might appear
perhaps somewhat invidious and is indeed not justified, between lawyers and
statesmen. For a further discussion, see Yntema, Mr. Justice Holes' View of
Legal Science (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 696.
'See, for instance, Beale et al., Marriage and the Domicile (1931) 44
HAnv.L REv. 5O, 501, 529; Cohen, Justice Holmes ad the Nature of the Law
(193r) 31 Cor- L. REV. 352 at 365 et seq.; Adler, Law and the Moden Mind:

a Symposium (0931) 31 CoL. LAw REv.

91, 92.
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established and formulated. There are at least four possible modi
operandi.
The first possible mode is to limit the initial purpose of investigation to a report upon widely representative phenomena,
conveniently classified and covering the area marked out for study.
In the development of a broad and somewhat unexplored field.
there is much to be said for this strategy; it is, indeed, the method
that Darwin followed in laying the basis for his epochal evolutionary theories. 4 1 At the same time, the report can be only a first
stage; it becomes fruitful as the experimental ground of comparison and classification. And, while it seems at the present highly
desirable in the study of the administration of justice generally
to concentrate maiden effects upon the report of actual conditions, 42 in the study of a more restricted problem it is possible
and appropriate to regard the report as an integral part of the
more advanced problems of correlation and measurement.
The second mode of measurement is, in reliance upon current
information as to the subject-matter, to set up hypothetical standards, ideals, criteria or norms, by which to classify and measure.
The real difficulty with this proposal for the case in hand lies in
the state of the current information; only the most rudimentary
data as to the actual operation of concurrent jurisdiction or, in43
deed, as to the administration of justice generally, are available.
'As Darwin stated: "By collecting all facts which bore in any way on
the variation of animals and plants under domestication and nature, some light

might perhaps be thrown on the whole subject. My first note book was opened
in July 1837. I worked on true Baconian principles, and, without any theory,
collected facts on a wholesale scale, more especially with respect to domesticated productions, by printed inquiries, by conversation with skilful breeders
and gardeners, and by extensive reading. When I see the list of books of all
kinds which I read and abstracted, including whole series of Journals and Transactions, I am surprised at my own industry. I soon perceived that selection
was the keystone of man's success in making useful races and animals and
plants. But how selection could be applied to organisms living in a state of
nature remained for some time a mystery to me." I FRANcIs DARWIN, LIFE
AND LETTERS OF CHARLES DARWIN (1887) 67.
This "systematic inquiry" was followed by what Pearson has described
as "the period of self-examination, which lasted four or five years and it was
not less than nineteen ycars before he gave the world his discovery in its final
form". See PEARSON, TIIE GRAmmAR OF SCIENCE (3d ed. 1911) 32, 33. See
the discussion in Frankfurter, op. cit. supra note 32.
'For a discussion of this point, see Yntema, op. cit. supra note 33.
'There seems to be general agreement as to the urgent need of systems
of judicial statistics: "Nor shall we be able to know how our courts function
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Thus, for instance, it might be postulated that a certain degree
of economy in time and in expense should characterize the administration of justice and that there should be sufficient predictability
in its operation to satisfy the desire,--especially of commercial
enterprises,-to be able to forecast decision. But, in the absence
of actual and comparatively representative information, any norms
thus postulated as to economy or predictability in the administration of justice, could scarcely be defined in other terms than those
of subjective personal judgment. Nor is it to be expected that
intuitively derived norms will have the flexibility or the precision
of detail which theories, as it were proliferated, in response to
observed phenomena may well have. Furthermore, there is a
certain risk that norms thus intuitively established will automatically delimit the range of interest in phenomena. Naturally,
these difficulties are present in greater or less degree in all investigation; hypothesis and concept are primary tools of analysis.
Nevertheless, it is desirable to minimize the difficulties and this
until an effective system of judicial statistics becomes part of our tr'adition
. . . The annual judicial statistics of England and Wales, Scotland, and Ireland, are a challenging commentary on our own lack of self-critique", FRANKCFURTER AND LANDIS, op. cit. supra note 34, at 52n. "There is an almost complete
absence of statistical data regarding the operation of courts in the adjudication
of civil cases. Nor is there much in the way of the consideration of the problem of devising and operating a system for the collection and presentation of
such statistics", WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 34, at 647. "Ours is the only
modern nation without data concerning the work of its courts. It would be
difficult to exaggerate the extent of our loss in this respect. It prevents agreement as to the causes for alleged defects. It prevents a common understanding
and acceptance among judges of their responsibility. It leaves us without data
greatly needed for social, criminal and procedural legislation." The Unified
State Conurt (1917) I JouR. Am. JUDICATURE SOC. 5 (quoted in FRANZFURTER
AND LANDIS, op. cit. supra note 34, at 2201.)
There is some prospect that the serious deficiencies in the federal judicial statistics, referred to in these statements, will be remedied in some measure in the near future. In the Report of Conference of Senior Circuit Judges,
October, I93O, Chief Justice Hughes indicated that the Judicial Conference has
taken under consideration the improvement of federal judicial statistics. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES (1930) 4,
8. Also, certain studies authorized by the National Commission on Law
Observance and Enforcement and especially that of the committee of which
Dean Clark is chairman, will provide statistical and other information as to
the federal courts, much needed and not now available.
The studies of the administration of justice initiated by The Institute of
Law in Ohio and Maryland have the purpose of supplying analogous information as to the administration of justice in these states and, more particularly,
of making possible the formulation of state systems of judicial statistics. See
7 et seq., and also
FIRST REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF OHIO (1931)
the references in Yntema, op. cit. supra note 33, at 358n.
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a highly a priori mode of stapdardization in an uncharted field
does not assure. It is, therefore, not reasonable to anticipate that
emphasis on this method of evaluation is the most promising for
the purpose in hand. It may be so but the odds are long. Concepts and norms are needed, not absolute and intuitively ascertained, but operational and responsive to representative, experimental observation.
The third and fourth modes of establishing types and standards are comparative. That is to say, the subject-matter to be
reported and classified is initially selected with a view to representing two or more comparable ranges or systems of phenomena,
whereas the first two modes typically involve the study of a single
range. Where it can be employed, the comparative method is, of
course, the most advantageous, since it not only permits the governing hypotheses to be initially stated in terms of a fairly coherent
and sometimes quite operable range of phenomena, but it also
enables hypotheses to be checked against more than one independent control-unit. This, as will be indicated, not only makes for
greater assurance in the conclusion but also facilitates the problems
of factor-analysis.
The distinction between the third and fourth modes of comparative analysis turns upon whether one of the two or more
ranges of phenomena under consideration is thought to be the
more significant and, hence, to furnish the standard types. Reference has already been made to a highly interesting project of this
character, in which the types for the study of judicial behavior
are to be furnished by the extra-legal activities of the social institutions affected. It has also been explained that this method is not
adapted to the problem in hand, since the activities to be studied
and classified dominantly operate within the administration of
justice itself. Consequently, in relating such activities to extrajudicial factors, it is not necessary to postulate beforehand degrees
of significance between the official and non-official, but they may be
permitted to develop in the course of investigation.44
"No criticism is implied of the study of official institutions by reference to
non-official activities. Indeed, investigation of this character is of vital importance to our knowledge of law, by reason of the fact that legal phenomena
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The fourth and essentially comparative mode of evaluation
is, therefore, primarily chosen for the present study. Its distinction from the preceling three methods lies in the statement and
testing of hypothetical types and standards by reference to two
or more distinct samples or ranges of phenomena, which are initially regarded as equivalent. Its first concern is, therefore, the
selection of the samples or ranges of phenomena. To this consideration must now be given.
In the selection of convenient samples or unitary ranges of
phenomena relating to the distribution of litigation for comparative study, it will be convenient to regard the subject-matter as tridimensional. This involves a gross classification according to
judicial system, geographic area, or period, in which homogeneity
as to subject-matter is assumed. Other comparative dimensions
are, of course, conceivable but unnecessary for the present purpose.
If now it can be assumed that the judicial systems in question
are geographically fixed and that comparative study is to be limited
to not more than two judicial systems, in one or two geographic
areas, for one or two defined periods, there will appear five alternative bases of selection. To illustrate, let S be a single judicial
system under consideration and S1 and S 2, two such systems; P a
single geographic area and Pi and P 2 , two different areas; and T
a single period and T 1 and T 2 , two different periods. Then, the
comparative types may be symbolized as follows:
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.

S at P tempo T1/S at P tempo T 2.
Si at P tempo T/S 2 at P tempo T.
Si at P tempo T 1 /S 2 at P tempo 72.
Si at P 1 tempo T/S 2 at P 2 tempo 7'.
Si at P 1 tempo T 1 /S 2 at P 2 tempo T 2 .

are frequently sporadic manifestations of economic and social phenomena. The
possibilities will be suggested by the important studies in the field of commercial banking, which are now in course of publication by Underhill Moore:
Underhill Moore and T. S. Hope, Jr., An Institutional Approach to the Law
of Commercial Banking (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 703; Underhill Moore and Gil-

bert Sussman, Legal and Irstitutional Methods Applied to the Debiting of Direct Disconats,I Legal Method: Bankers' Set-off, II Institutional Method, III
The Connecticut Studies (931) 40 YALE L. J. 381, 555, 752.
It may perhaps be remarked that, much as the institutional focus in the
study of commercial banking is set by the commercial banking institutions, so

in a study of judicial administration, such as is here contemplated, the institutional focus is in the courts and other official institutions.
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It is obvious that this scheme will be further elaborated in dealing
with a larger number of judicial systems, geographic areas, or
periods.
If now it be granted that the differentiae between two judicial
systems can be more readily fixed than those between two geographic areas or periods, considered as units of human activity,
it will appear that the second type is the most advantageous for
initial study, since the variations arising from divergence in geographic area or period can be reasonably eliminated by hypothesis,
(even admitting that there is no complete geographic or periodic
identity in detail). On the other hand, the first type, which represents a possible method of comparative historical study, involves
the difficulties inherent in factoring general social and economic
changes. The third type, which contrasts two different, concurrent and co-geographic systems at different periods, is subject to
the same observation. The fourth and fifth types, which suggest
the more usual situation of two different judicial systems in different areas, considered in the one case, without, and in the other
with reference to different periods, may exist either within a
given geographically specialized judicial system (by considering
the geographic units of the system as the equivalents of separate
judicial systems) or in a situation of two autonomous judicial
systems in two different areas. In either case, the problems of
geographic and, in the case of the fifth type, of periodic factors
are present. In view of these considerations, the present study,
being an experimental preliminary endeavor, is primarily of phenomena corresponding to the second type or, in other words, of
contemporaneous, concurrent jurisdictions in the same geographic
area. It need scarcely be remarked that the concurrent jurisdictions of the state and federal courts are of this character and
afford convenient, possible samples for comparative study.
However, it should be noted that, although the general socioeconomic background of concurrent jurisdiction in the same area
and period may, by tentative hypothesis, be regarded as one and
the same, it cannot be assumed that the judicial structures having
concurrent jurisdiction, are entirely homogeneous as to personnel,
procedure, or law. This circumstance is, however, rather advan-
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tageous than the contrary. In the first place, as has above been
intimated, the concurrent jurisdictions, to which attention is being
directed, may be expected to exhibit similarity, greater than would
normally be true of jurisdictions separated in time or space, but
nevertheless partial, not complete. In the second place, the range
of divergencies is thus not merely limited but is in a degree limited
to specific administrative characters, which can be more readily
fixed than those of a more general, cultural nature, whether of
geographic or periodic origin. Analysis must, therefore, seek to
indicate how the points of difference can be defined and to lay
the basis for the comparison of corresponding sets of concurrent
jurisdictions in various state areas, so as to isolate particular
divergent factors, so far as possible. Thus, the salient advantage
of studying the distribution of litigation by reference to contemporaneous, concurrent jurisdictions in a given area, is that experimental conditions can be in some measure controlled by narrowing
and selecting the range of divergent factors.
V
There remain the problems of what may be termed factoranalysis, of suggesting the modes by which phenomena selected in
accordance with the foregoing analysis may be classified, stated in
trends, and correlated with factors, expressive of conditions in the
administration of justice. Recurrences within the phenomena
studied will be suggestive, but it will be necessary to do more than
observe repetition. The single case may be a crucial experiment.
One and a complex set of problems has already been hinted
at; the analysis above was said to assume homogeneity of subjectmatter. But, obviously, the assumption presupposes a sufficient
classification of the types of cases studied according to their nature
and social derivation. This will, among other things, envisage
the relation of judicial practices to the extra-legal institutional life
from which litigation flows. As intimated elsewhere, 45 it is likely
that the convenient unit for comparative purposes will remain the
YNTEMA,

THE AscERTAiNMENT OF

Fcrs

AS TO THE ADMINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE. INTERIM STATEMENT-STUDY OF JUDIcIAL ADMINISTRATION IN OHIO

(0930) 8 et seq. 13.
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controversy, and that it will need to be dissected in terms of the
parties and the transaction, as well as of the technical processes
involved, their actual conditions and effects. The problems involved can scarcely be said to have been seriously faced in other
than traditional terms, at least as far as civil litigation is concerned,
nor can they here be further discussed.
Furthermore, this more general classification of case-types
will require refinement from the point of view of the distribution
of litigation. For instance, the concurrent litigation in a given
state selected for examination will need to be defined, not only
by reference to the specific types of situations in which jurisdictional concurrence is there possible, but also in view of the determination of the forum. Thus, the cases of the concurrent types
should be classified, not only according to the court in which they
are actually litigated, but also according to the court in which they
might have been litigated. And the cases, thus grouped, should
again be distributed and analyzed according to the party having the
power of selection of the forum and the mode or stage in which
it occurs. It will thus appear that the sample to be studied in a
particular state is not merely dual, as it should comprehend both
the federal and the state cases of the concurrent types, but even
quadruple, as these cases will again be divided according as there
is or is not concurrence into four ranges of case-phenomena.
Assuming these classifications, it will be requisite to establish
mass bases of comparison between the four ranges of cases in the
sample on points such as follow: i. Total number of cases in
each range and of each significant type. 2. Similar totals over
a period of time so as to verify trends. 3. Cost totals, standardized so as to give the average cost per case of each type. 4. Intervals of time between initiation of case and trial and between
trial and ultimate disposition. 5. Certainty and predictability of
the outcome in terms of: (i) Ratio of cases settled to total number of cases brought. (ii) Ratio of cases tried to total number
of cases brought. (iii) Ratio of cases resulting in judgment for
plaintiff to total number of cases brought. (iv) Ratio of cases
tried in which plaintiff obtained judgment to cases tried and decided for defendant. (v) Ratio of amount adjudged to plaintiff
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to amount claimed, (in both liquidated and unliquidated damage
cases), and of amount collected to amount awarded by judgment.
Having thus stated each of the four ranges of phenomena
observed in the state and federal cases, concurrent and non-concurrent, in terms which will in a sense serve as common denominators, it will be possible to make tentative findings as to the drifts
of the civil litigation in question and of the specific types. In this
further comparisons will be useful, e. g.,-(a) the ratio of state
cases to federal cases; (b, c, d, e) the ratios of cases originating
in federal courts, or of cases involving a choice of the state courts,
to the total number of concurrent cases: (f, g) the ratios of concurrent state or federal cases to the total number of non-concurrent
cases. By thus formulating conditions in a given state over a
period of time in ratios stated in common terms, not only will some
indication be given of the drifts of concurrent litigation within the
state itself, but a comparison of the ratios of concurrence in different states may be tried. It is highly desirable to provide such a
basis in order to take advantage of the varying conditions under
which the phenomena of concurrence operate in different state
areas. The questions involved in the correlation of the phenomena
of concurrence with their peculiar conditions raise the problem of
factor-analysis, which may noiy be briefly faced.
It has above been indicated that the selection of concurrent
litigation for study minimizes geographic and periodic divergencies, and thus serves to narrow the range of conditions operative
in a given area so as to control somewhat experimental observation. Further, that the sample suggested provides four ranges
of case-phenomena, comprising both concurrent and non-concurrent cases in the state and federal courts, by reference to which
correlations can be established and the factors in some measure
isolated. Add to this that the limited range of conditions, thus
isolable without immediate reference to those of geographic or
periodic origin, may be varied and controlled in some degree by
appropriate selection from the forty-eight state areas, each of
which provides varying sets of divergencies between the state and
federal courts therein, and the major outlines of the problem of
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factor-analysis emerge. Its concern is two-fold: with the selection
of the factors or conditions to be correlated with the concurrent
phenomena as initially stated, and with the isolation of such factors so as to verify or correct tentative correlations. In other
words, the problem is to relate the types of concurrence with further typical but variant factors in the phenomena.
The selection of factors must be in some degree by cut nd
try. Yet the hypotheses to be tried need not be launched simply
from the limbo of intuition; in the present instance, the analysis
has already pointed to an area in which they are likely to be found
and indicated a method. This is by a determination of the divergencies between the state and federal courts in the state chosen
for study. Preliminary samplings have suggested the possible
significance of factors such as:
(i) Selection, tenure and powers of the judge. The possible
variations range from the situation in states where the position and
powers of the state judges are substantially comparable to those
of the federal judge,-where, in other words, they are appointed
for life and have power both to comment upon the evidence and
to direct the verdict of a jury,--to that in states where, in contrast
to the federal judiciary, the state judges are elected for limited
terms, have very limited powers in the conduct of the trial and are
subject to judicial recall.
(2) Character of the jury. The districts, urban or rural,
and the economic or cultural levels from which juries are drawn
may vary in the state as contrasted with the federal courts and the
variances may well be found significant.
(3) The substantive rule of law governing the specific type
of case. It is well known that, under the doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson, the federal courts may, in given cases, disregard the state
law. 46 Conversely, subject to certain constitutional limitations,
the state courts are not bound to follow the law applied by the
federal courts. There is thus a possibility of difference between
the precedents followed in the state and federal courts, which may
be material in specific instances.
"See

supra note 23.
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(4) Procedure. The state and federal remedies may not
correspond or may be differently administered. Thus, the procedural practices in the state courts proper may range from the type
of the group of code states, which have purported to abolish the
common law forms of action and the traditional distinction between law and equity, to that of the federal courts, which retain
the historic distinction between law and equity and tend to emphasize the forms of action by the theory of the pleading. Or, apart
from such formal differences, there may be significant variations
in the actual administration of similar rules, e. g., of evidence, in
the state and federal courts.
(5) State of the calendar or docket. In general, congestion
in the state or federal dockets will be primarily controlled by the
great mass of non-concurrent litigation and by the organization
of the respective courts. This will condition the dispatch of judicial business which varies materially in the state courts, as well as
in the federal courts themselves, which, for example, in certain
districts are said to be literally overwhelmed with prohibition cases.
(6) Cost of litigation in the state as contrasted with the
federal courts.
(7) Convenience and accessibility of location of federal and
state courts to specific litigants. The possible influence of these
considerations is qualified by varying rules as to venue in the
various states.
(8) Specialization of practice in law-offices, which may influence the selection of the forum and qualify the personnel of the
local federal bar.
Although the preceding enumeration is only suggestive, not
exhaustive, of the possible factors with which the distribution of
concurrent litigation may be correlated, it may be well to explain,
in view of the emphasis often given to local prejudice in this
subject-matter, that local prejudice will probably not be found a
useful analytical counter and for two reasons. The first is the
ubiquitous and undifferentiated character of the concept; consequently, it will be preferable to direct the analysis to more specific
relations, from which indications as to local prejudice may be
drawn, as for instance, the ratios of predictability, the relation
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between the position of the judge or the character of the jury to
the decision, etc. The second is that, the state and federal judges
and juries being drawn from the same state area, both courts may
well be subject to similar sectional influences, except as to specific
items which must be segregated as suggested. In other words, the
existence of local prejudice is as a rule to be inferred from more
specific factors, and in its larger aspects will need to be studied
in more than one section of the country. Nor can the study of
concurrent jurisdiction rest with the determination of local prejudice; its presence or absence is not necessarily critical, as is
generally assumed. In short, local prejudice is an item to be considered more especially in connection with the second aspect of the
factor-analysis under discussion,-the correlation and isolation of
factors.
As to this, it will be remarked, in the first instance, that a
certain measure of precision can be secured in the study of the cases
even within a single state area. By selecting a state in which the
disparities between the state and federal courts are not too wide
and numerous for initial study, by classifying the cases into specific
types, and by selecting the types so as to reduce the number of
factors under observation, (possibly to a single factor), and by
verifying the correlations thus obtained by comparison with types
in which the factors are alternated, tentative inferences will be
indicated. Thus, if three analogous groups of cases can be selected, the first involving factor A, the second factors B and C, and
the third factors A, B, and C, the correlations suggested by the
first type can be verified by comparing the second and third types.
Necessarily, the process will be far more intricate and cautious
than this, but the illustration will crudely suggest the method.
For various reasons, it can scarcely be anticipated that the
study of concurrent jurisdictions in any given state will permit
anything but highly tentative conclusions or that all significant
factors can be thus isolated. Even in the larger federal districts,
the sample will provide but a limited number of cases for specific
types and, in any event, the factors which can be manipulated in
the manner suggested will be restricted to those indicated by the
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disparities in the particular state and federal courts. Furthermore,
for reasons already suggested, the study of concurrent jurisdictions in a single state is not competent to indicate the influence
of geographic or sectional influences, which, for instance, may well
prove of special significance in the ascertainment of possible local
prejudices. Hence, to establish the basis for the more adequate
verification of working hypotheses as to the facts of concurrence,
it will be desirable to extend the inquiry to a representative selection of state jurisdictions.
The method involved in this more extensive study will be, in
the first instance, simply an expansion of that above outlined. The
state areas should be selected so as to provide representation, not
only of the different sections or economic and social inilieux of the
country, but also of the more specific variant factors deemed to be
significant in the internal administration of justice. Presumably,
it will be advantageous to select for initial examination a jurisdiction in which the state system of justice most nearly approximates
the federal and the economic conditions are typical, in order to
reduce a complicated problem to the simplest possible terms and to
provide a starting point from which to gauge phenomena in other
jurisdictions. In any event, the successive analyses of the situation
in each of the state areas thus selected may follow lines as above
suggested. With the results of such representative studies in
hand, the analysis of determinant factors may be more comprehensively and more confidently prosecuted.
The analysis, worked out primarily for the study of a given
state area, has in general assumed the negligibility of geographic
factors for the purpose in hand, on the ground that for any given
type of case they may be taken to be identic within the area. In its
final stage, the extension of the inquiry to several state areas will
permit the assumption to be tested by a comparison both of the
mass statistical correlations in the different areas, if and when
available, and of the phenomena in particular types of cases in
different areas, in which the non-geographic factors are more or
less similar. It may be added that analogous procedures could,
if desired, be employed for the determination of periodic factors.
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The analysis thus outlined contemplates a study of the distribution of litigation, essentially objective, comparative, rational
and experimental. It does not promise the prompt reform of
theoretically assumed evils in the administration of justice. It
does not presuppose phenomenal simplicity in diversity. It proposes to utilize the tools of rational hypothesis but, rejecting the
self-sufficiency of intuitive theory as a scientific fallacy, it would
endeavor to relate concept and theory to representative experience.
Nor does the analysis purport to be comprehensive or final. Indeed, important avenues of inquiry have been consciously abstracted, slighted or even ignored, in order to reduce matters to
minimal terms. It is not offered as an inherently necessary mode
of examining the interesting phenomena of concurrent jurisdiction; variations of technique or hypothesis may be found more
fruitful, and, in any event, we are not of those who put much faith
in a prioritiesof method. With such a character, painstaking and
tentative, the proposal will doubtless not attract those who solicit
an intuitive conception of law, simple, confident, attainable without
effort and without delay. It could scarcely be otherwise; the traditional way of normative logic and reform is not that of science.
Yet, perhaps, the previous remarks, fragmentary as they
must be, will suggest certain conclusions, not without implication.
First, as is being slowly perceived, that the administration of
justice in this country is a greater unity of diversity than that of
any particular system of courts, state or federal, and that, certainly within the sphere of jurisdictional concurrence, the problems
of the distribution of litigation between the state and federal
courts are problems, not so much of federal jurisdiction, as of the
administration of justice within the several states. And further,
that some such patient process of investigation as has been
sketched,-of analysis and verification, not of mere intuitive theorization,--must be undertaken, if the facts as to the actual
distribution of the more important types of civil litigation in this
country are to be explained, valued, or even stated,-facts that
are all too cavalierly taken for granted in current discussion. As
things stand, the bliss of ignorance is the frequent inspiration of
theory and reform.
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APPENDIX

"The Flood of Diversity of Citizenship Litigation" 47
There is at the present time no one in this country who, by
virtue of scholarly study and academic position, is entitled to speak
with greater authority on questions of federal jurisdiction than
Professor Felix Frankfurter. The brilliantly written monograph
on "The Business of the Supreme Court", jointly authored with
Professor James Landis, and a comprehensive series of articles,
already alluded to,48 are highly suggestive and useful.

Under the

circumstances, it has been necessary to examine the evidence and
conclusions offered in these works as to the federal diverse-citizenship litigation for the purposes of the proposed study. And it has
seemed only fair, as queries developed on particular points, to
state the grounds of dubiety, at least in a preliminary way.
This feeling has been strengthened by the fact that apparently
rather definite conclusions have been reached as to the federal
diverse-citizenship jurisdiction, which have not been permitted to
waste their sweetness on the academic air. They have been set
forth by their author as a basis for the reform of the federal judiciary in this subject-matter 4' and there is some indication that
they have been in part accepted as a basis of argument even by
those who do not share the view that this branch of the federal
jurisdiction should be severely restricted by Congress, if not
abolished. 50 The matter is, therefore, of present public interest.
'FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, op. cit. supra note 34, at 82.
'Supra notes 24 and 34.
"Thus, the article, The Federal Courts, supra note 18, in which suggestions were made as to the federal diverse-citizenship litigation, was addressed
to the then prospective National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, which was appointed shortly thereafter, May 20, 1929.
' Compare, for instance, the statement in the address of the Hon. Gurney
Newlin: "Another argument sometimes advanced by those who seek to abolish
the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction of the Federal Courts is that such a
step would materially relieve the present congestion of the dockets of such
courts. That such would be the effect in large measure I do not deny, for the
reason that at the present time between 20 per cent. and 3o per cent., approximately, of the cases arising in the Federal courts are based upon the diversity
of citizenship jurisdiction." Op. cit. supra note 26, at 404.
See also the statement of Senator Norris in the Report of the Committee
on the Judiciary: "Of all the suggestions which have been made from any
source there is none which will bring as much relief as would the enactment
of this proposed bill. It is estimated that the work of the Federal judiciary
would be decreased from 25 to 40 per cent if this bill should be enacted into
law. Not only would this relief for the Federal judiciary take place, but it
would do it without any injustice of any kind coming to any person or corporation. We are continually met with the demand for more judges, and if
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The principal specific queries, which have thus developed as
to the argument set forth in these works and sketched in the first
section of this analysis, are four: i. That inferences from the
evidence as to the historic basis of the federal diverse-citizenship
jurisdiction, are suggested, which appear to be uncritical of the
nature and extent of the evidence and, in some degree, contrary
thereto. The details have been previously discussed."l 2. That, as
before indicated, 52 the negligibility of local prejudice as a present
basis for the federal diverse-citizenship jurisdiction is suggested
by an argument drawn from the development of a national economic structure, which does not offer a basis for evaluating the
contribution of the federal judiciary to a situation in which it is
and has been a constant factor. 3. That the doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson is said not to make for uniformity, on evidence which is
quite unrepresentative. A small part of the detail involved has
been outlined. 3 * 4. That, on the indications now available, the
proportion of the litigation in the federal district courts attributable to the jurisdiction of controversies between citizens of different states is grossly overestimated.
It is not controverted that, improbable as it is, on the points
mentioned the argument may eventually prove to be true; all that
is suggested is that the argument on these points does not accurately
summarize the existing evidence for scientific purposes. With the
obvious practical implications, these remarks do not deal. For the
showing on the first three points, reference may be made to the
notes as indicated; on the fourth point, a summary of part of
the evidence available is here given.
The statement to which attention is directed is that:
"Certainly the obvious abuses of diversity jurisdiction
should be promptly removed by legislation---on plain grounds
of policy, and to relieve the overburdened federal dockets.
we provided for enough district judges to do all the work of the district
courts and keep the dockets of those courts up to date, it would require a very
large number of additional judges, prosecuting attorneys, United States marshals, and all other officials which necessarily go to the establishment and
maintenance of courts of justice. If all the cases involving diverse citizenship
should be left for the State courts, where they fairly and honestly belong,
this congestion in Federal courts would be relieved, the demand for more Federal judges would disappear, and all this would occur without any injustice
to anyone." SEN. REP. 691, supra note 7, at 5.
ISuprao notes io, 12 and 13.
' Supra note 22.
'Supra note 23.
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In the absence of an adequate system of federal judicial
statistics, we are without an exact basis for analyzing the
scope and nature of federal court business. That the diversity cases represent one of its heaviest items is common
knowledge. According to the usual estimate, they constitute
one-third of the business of the district courts. An examination of ten recent volumes of the Federal Reporter shows
that out of 3618 full opinions, 959, or 27 percent, were written in cases arising solely out of diversity of citizenship." 54
The statement was repeated on at least three occasions " and has
56
seemingly been accepted as authoritative in practical discussion.
In view of the divergence between this estimate and preliminary findings from other sources, an effort was made at verification. In the first instance, the Annual Reports of the Attorney
General of the United States were consulted, and the results are
in part indicated below in Table I, which covers the period from
19o4, when the present classification was introduced. In addi'Frankfurter,
(193o), in (I93O)

1O, at 523.
TENURE OF OFFICE

op. cit. sipra note

In his review of

HART,

UNDER

THE CONSTITUTION

44 HARv. L. REv. 145, Professor Landis does not venture

an estimate. He states: "So again, Mr. Hart in describing the area of modern
government says that the jurisdiction of the federal courts over cases of diverse citizenship has greatly expanded. P. 4. So far as the grant of statutory jurisdiction is concerned, the reverse is true. And as to the tendency to
resort to federal courts upon this ground, the Johns Hopkins Institute of Law
is now, I believe, spending several thousands of dollars in the laudable effort
to discover whether it is on the increase or decrease."
The statement as to the grant of statutory jurisdiction may be compared
with

FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS,

op. Cit.

supra

note 34 at 64, 65, where it is

said: "Thus, from many sources flowed new and deeper streams of business
to the federal courts. All of them were powerfully reinforced by the Removal
Act of 1875. From 1789 down to the Civil War the lower federal courts were,
ivthe main, designed as protection to citizens litigating outside of their own
states and thereby exposed to the threatened prejudice of unfriendly tribunals.
Barring admiralty jurisdiction, the federal courts were subsidiary courts. The
Act of 1875 marks a revolution in their function. . . . The old jurisdiction
in cases of diverse citizenship was retained. It had been enormously extended
in practice through the developing doctrine of corporate citizenship, as well
as by legislation prior to 1875. To the increasing volume of litigation due to
diversity of citizenship, the Act of 1875 opened wide a flood of totally rew
business for the federal courts. This development in the federal judiciary,
which in the retrospect seems revolutionary, received hardly a contemporary
comment."

See also ibid. lO5, 230, 293.

It should perhaps be added that the reference to the Institute of Law was
not authorized.
'
See, in addition to the article cited above in note IO,the paper in the NEw
REPUBLIC, supra note 24, at 276 'and the address before the New Jersey State
Bar Association, supr note 24, at 122.
11See supra note 5o.
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tion, a careful study was made of the cases in the ten volumes of
the Federal Reporter, (13-22 inclusive, 2d series), on which the
statement was based, and the results are summarized in Table II.
In both instances, the enumeration is of cases in the federal district courts and, in the second table, particular care was taken to
discriminate those cases in which diversity of citizenship was the
sole ground of federal jurisdiction. It has been impossible to
explain the disparity between the count of cases summarized in
Table II and that given in the statement above, except perhaps
on the theory that in the latter case the cases in the district courts
were not distinguished from those on appeal. Needless to say, the
cases in the circuit courts of appeals have no direct bearing upon
the percentages of litigation in the district courts.
Our estimate, which is subject to revision as better evidence
becomes available, is, therefore, that the diverse-citizenship cases
constitute at present something like five per cent. of the total litigation in the federal district courts, instead of 27%. This does
not seem excessive, as the. percentage of private civil cases has
not exceeded 12.47 in the past eight years and, in the reports
consulted, the "diversity" cases form less than a third of the
private civil cases.
A further and more revealing inference is suggested by the
items tabulated. "Critical analysis", we are told, "differentiates
merely temporary congestions from permanent accretions of business, calling for permanent relief." 57 As Table I shows, in the
twenty-seven years from 1904 to 1930, the total number of federal

trial cases has quadrupled; the civil cases to which the United
States is a party have increased more than twelve-fold; criminal
cases about five times; and bankruptcy litigation is almost four
times as frequent. On the other hand, admiralty cases have increased by hardly more than 50%, while the private civil cases,
including those between citizens of different states, have not quite
doubled. Stated in terms of percentages of the total federal litigation, the civil cases to which the United States is a party have
increased from 3Y20 to over I2%; the criminal cases from

36% to between 45% and 5o% and the proportion of bankruptcy
cases remains about one-third. In contrast, the percentage of
admiralty cases has declined from 3% to something over io,
and that of the private civil cases from about 25% to about io%.
As soon as something like an index of the general increase in litigation in this country since i9oo is available, the trends can be
" FRANKFURTR AN) LANDIS,

op. cit. =pra note 34, at 244.
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interpreted with more confidence. For the present, the figures
do not warrant the assumption that the federal courts have been
called upon to bear a disproportionate share of civil litigation,rather the contrary. And they clearly indicate that the expansion
of federal trial litigation has been most disproportionate in the
cases to which the United States is a party, criminal and civil.
The general statistics may be deceptive, but they do not tend
to show that the diverse-citizenship cases, only a fraction of
private litigation in the federal courts, bulk at all large in the total,
whether absolutely, proportionately or prospectively. The "flood"
recedes upon casual inspection.
Two further remarks are pertinent. In the first place, it was
obviously somewhat preposterous to take the reports referred to
in Table II as a statistical basis for estimating federal trial litigation. Apparently less than one case in a hundred and fifty in the
federal district courts is reported. And, as a comparison of the
tables below will suggest, the federal trial reports are not representative. Criminal cases, constituting almost half of the total
trial litigation, occupy from three to eight per cent of the reports;
about fifteen per cent of the reports are of admiralty cases, which
form two per cent. or less of the total of cases tried. The selection
of cases in the reports, moreover, is not only unequally distributed
but is not a fair random sample within the distribution. Cases
are reported, not because they are typical but because they are
not so,-because they involve novel problems or new applications
of law. Hence, it was not to be anticipated that the reports would
representatively reflect the actualities of litigation, as their essential purpose is rather to develop legal doctrine under the principles
of staredecisis. Once more is the rather obvious point illustrated,
that the reports are a fragmentary and biased evidence of what
in fact takes place in the halls of justice,5 and particularly in that
strategic institution, whose "activities are all that most litigants
are ever concerned with", "the American Trial Court." "
Secondly, even were the reports sampled representative of
the actual trial litigation, the method of simple enumeration employed is not of itself an eligible basis of inference as to the
diverse-citizenship litigation. It is undiscriminating. Parity of individual cases is taken for granted on vital points,-'the types and
volume of litigation, the character of issues, the duration of trials,
r'Cf. Yntema, op. cit. supra note 33.

"' We are indebted for this expression to Dean Arnold, Book Review (1931)

40 YALE L. J. 833, 835.
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the speed of disposition, the delay of appeals." 60 On other
scores, the method is as defective. In effect, it proposes to dispatch the matter of federal diverse-citizenship litigation on superficial assumptions of uniformity in judicial administration, law
and litigation throughout the country and fails to suggest the
significance of the federal litigation in question to the total civil
litigation in any state. Figures, so arrived at, may be scantily
suggestive, but they do not solve; as the preceding analysis has
endeavored to show, the crucial problems are those of description,
classification, and interpretation and not of mere enumeration.
Current juristic realism has recently been admonished for
"faith in masses of figures as having significance in and of themselves," combined with "insistence on the unique single case." 61
The admonition has perhaps not been most usefully addressed to
the realists. It might have been supposed that so elementary a
suggestion were least needed by those, who, by experience, not
merely theoretical or vicarious, with the detailed problems of
judicial statistics, have very soon been made painfully aware of

the limitations and difficulties as well as the possibilities. But
the precept finds point in the present instance. In the light of this
discussion, it may be paralleled by two other precepts, quite as
elementary and, it would seem, equally relevant,-namely, that the
sample should be appropriate to the purpose and that the sums
should be faithfully done. These three, be it remarked, are not
merely statistical precepts; they apply with as much force to the
manipulation of the symbols which are words.
o FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, op. cit. sapra note 34, at 220. See also ibid.
z44 and 253.
6 Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence (1931) 44 HARv. L. Rav.

697, 701, 707.
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TABLE I
CASES FIED IN THE FEDERAL DisTRicT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES
(ExCLUDING ALASKA, HAWAII AND PORTO Rico), i9o4-i93o*

Number of Cases Filed Each Year
Civil Cases to
Total No. which U. S. Criminal
BankYear
Cases
is a Party
Cases Admiralty ruptcy
1904
49818
1787
18296
156o
17047
1974
18669
1593
16913
1905
50984
1667
17280
1628
12941
45846
19o6
1907
50064
2618
18007
1540
14123
3194
13034
2191
16803
19o844050
3134
14128
1379
17983
1909
44920
3155
14407
16oi
18017
191o
45607
1911
47553
3773
14788
1673
19308
3975
i56o1
1619
19700
1912
49729
1913
51696
3723
16425
1991
20870
1914
567o1
4083
18088
1865
22875
1915
61686
3555
19490
2047
27519
1916
63894
3473
19916
2296
27271
1917
61o4i
3509
19373
2505
24789
1918
7o869
2856
34344
2659
20331
4942
46868
2576
13989
1919
79207
1920
90091
5667
54998
3198
13515
1921
107755
9665
53399
4550
22711
9607
59181
4391
38014
1922
128394
1o915
69640
3015
41152
1923
14o896
1924
146138
13545
69243
3048
43356
16056
75273
2904
45469
1925
158040
1926
151926
17313
67719
2822
4619o
17664
641o8
3614
48596
1927
152879
1928

179495

20513

82722

2820

52909

1929

187308
196953

24147
24713

85574
86719

2267
2489

57102
62643

1930

Private
Civil
Cases

Percentage
of Private
Civil Cases

11128
11835
12330

22.3
23.2
26.9

13776

27.5

8828

20.0

8296
8427
8011
8834
8687
9790
9075
10938
io865
1O679
10832
12713
17430
17201
16174
16946
18338
17882
18897
20531
18238
20389

18.5
18.5
16.9
17.8
16.8
17.3
14.7
17.1
17.8
15.1
13.7
14.1
16.2
134
11.5
11.6
11.6
11.8
12.4
11.4
9.7
10.4

*The cases enumerated in the table for years 19o4-1911, include
the federal circuit and district courts, which are comparable to the
trict cases after 1911, when the circuit courts were abolished and
diction transferred to the district courts. See Judicial Code, 36
(1911). Cf. 28 U. S. C. A. § 434 (1928).

the cases in
federal distheir jurisSTAT. 1168
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TABLE II
CASES IN THE F Ew. DiSTcr Couirs REPoRTED IN VoLumES 13-22, INCLUSIVE, OF THE FEaEaAL REPORTER 2D SERIES (AUGUST, I926-FEBRUARY, 1928)

Number of Cases in Each Volume

Percentages.

C,

0

L.

.0

z

C)

0,

E.

.?;

.S

U

4-

t.
'Ali u-UUC

X35

36

io

10

193
X43
99
x65

54
33

39

37

9
6
8
14

152
105

4x
33

6
8

I4

3

125

41
74
36

12
1o

Total 1445

409

86

214

24

0

&

,uul

E

58

27

31

43.0

65

17

48

33.7

8

50

20

30

35.0

14.0

31

21
26
23

14
24

.9
18

44

14

72

22

30
50

44.4
43.6

14.1
13.3

16

46"

43

10

33

28.3

6.6

13
1I
31

32

10

22

30.5

9.5

44

30
58

38.6
33.6

12.3

72

r4
14

20

19
15
25
15

44

14

30

35.2

11.2

209

217

524

162

362

36.3

11.2

20.0

6.5

